Equal Protection in Jury Selection - the Implementation of Batson v. Kentucky in North Carolina by Schwartz, Paul H.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 69 | Number 6 Article 2
9-1-1991
Equal Protection in Jury Selection - the
Implementation of Batson v. Kentucky in North
Carolina
Paul H. Schwartz
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North
Carolina Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation




Equal Protection in Jury Selection? The Implementation of
Batson v. Kentucky in North Carolina
We look to the jury box as to a sacred shrine, the place where human
justice holds the scales to measure out the dues of man.I
For most of the twentieth century, all states have permitted prosecutors to
exercise peremptory challenges2 --the removal of prospective jurors from the ve-
nire "without cause, without explanation and without judicial scrutiny.' 3 Since
1868, however, the fourteenth amendment4 has forbidden states to discriminate
against racial and other protected groups without constitutionally sufficient rea-
sons for treating those groups differently. 5 The conflict between these two fea-
tures of the American justice system is inescapable.6 By exercising peremptory
challenges, the prosecutor can exclude entire groups of individuals from the jury
without having to provide any, let alone constitutionally sufficient, justifications.
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, to the contrary, re-
quires that government officials adequately explain actions directed against
1. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 19, fyers v. Boice Hardwood Co., 201 N.C. 75, 159 S.E. 3
(1931) (No. 651).
2. Although the peremptory challenge is centuries old and embedded in the Anglo-American
judicial process, the government's right to exercise peremptory challenges was not firmly established
until the beginning of the twentieth century. See J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES:
OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATiVE PANELs 150 (1977); Brown, McGuire &
Winters, The Peremptory Challenge as a Manipulative Device in Criminal Trials" Traditional Use or
Abuse, 14 NEw ENG. L. REv. 192, 195 (1978); infra notes 26-45 and accompanying text.
3. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212 (1965).
4. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment provides that "[n]o State shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1.
5. See, eg., J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.2, at 525 (3d
ed. 1986) (equal protection clause ensures that government does not make arbitrary classifications);
Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341, 365 (1949) (classifi-
cations made by government must be reasonably related to the purpose of the law). The equal
protection clause originally was intended to protect black persons from discrimination. Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879). Since then, the Supreme Court has held that the fourteenth
amendment also applies to nonracial classifications, although the level of its protection varies with
the classification. See, eg., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985)
(mental capacity); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (gender); Massachusetts Bd. of Retire-
ment v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (age); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,483-87 (1970)
(number of children); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955) (profession).
6. Jurists and commentators also have argued that the peremptory challenge conflicts with
other constitutional provisions. Some have contended that the prosecutor's peremptory removal of
specific groups from the jury violates the defendant's sixth amendment right to a jury drawn from a
fair cross-section of the community. See, e.g., McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1131 (2d Cir.
1984); Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?-Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine, Images, and Proce-
dures, 64 N.C.L. REv. 501, 541-63 (1986). In 1990, however, the Supreme Court rejected this con-
tention. See Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 807-11 (1990). At least one commentator has argued
that because peremptory challenges are exercised arbitrarily and capriciously, prosecutorial peremp-
tory challenges deprive defendants of their fifth and fourteenth amendment rights to due process of
law. See Note, Due Process Limits on Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenges, 102 HARV. L. REv.
1013, 1024-33 (1989).
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members of protected groups. "The Equal Protection Clause says in essence,
'When the government treats people differently, it has to have a reason.' The
peremptory challenge says in essence, 'No, it doesn't.' "7
Nevertheless, both the equal protection clause and the peremptory chal-
lenge exist to secure fundamental rights. The equal protection clause aims to
protect the fundamental human right to freedom from invidious discrimination.
The peremptory challenge seeks to ensure the right to an impartial jury.8 Con-
sequently, in spite of the ever-present tension between the equal protection
clause and the peremptory challenge, the United States Supreme Court has
searched for ways to guarantee equal protection to protected groups while pre-
serving the State's right to exercise peremptory challenges. In the landmark
case of Batson v. Kentucky,9 decided in 1986, the Court embarked on its most
recent attempt to reconcile the arbitrary nature of the peremptory challenge
with the dictates of the equal protection clause. Five years later, the question
arises whether lower courts charged with implementing Batson have made pro-
gress toward the Court's Solomonic goal of ending the discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges without abolishing the peremptory challenge entirely.
This Comment explores that question as it applies to the appellate courts of
North Carolina.
The clash between the peremptory challenge and the equal protection
clause is the latest battle in a conflict that racial and ethnic minorities and the
states have been waging since the ratification of the fourteenth amendment: the
fight over how far the equal protection clause reaches to protect minorities
against unconstitutionally motivated exclusion from jury service by the State. 10
At first, states attempted to preclude minorities from being called to jury service
altogether.11 After minorities won the right to be included on jury lists, prose-
cutors began to use peremptory challenges to bar minority persons from sitting
on juries. 12 In 1986 the Batson Court recognized that the problem of racially
motivated peremptory challenges had become widespread.13 The Court, how-
ever, refused to address the problem by abolishing the peremptory challenge
altogether. 14 Instead, the Court attempted to provide defendants with an effec-
tive means of proving discrimination. Under Batson, the prosecutor must come
forward with race-neutral reasons for her peremptory challenges once the de-
7. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the
Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 153, 203 (1989).
8. The sixth amendment provides, in part, that "[i]n all criminal proceedings, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a... trial, by an impartial jury." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
9. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
10. See, eg., Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 327 (1970) (substantial underrepresentation
of minorities on jury lists); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 561 (1953) (discriminatory formation of
jury lists); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 387-88 (1880) (jury service limited to qualified voters;
black persons not qualified to vote); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1879) (per se
statutory prohibition of jury service by black persons).
11. Neal, 103 U.S. at 387; Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305.
12. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 150; Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL.
L. REv. 235, 283 (1968).
13. Batson, 476 U.S. at 101 (White, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 99 n.22.
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fendant makes a threshold showing of an inference of discrimination. 15 The
Court left to state and lower federal courts the task of fleshing out the eviden-
tiary framework--determining what evidence gives rise to an inference of dis-
crimination and what proffered reasons rebut such an inference. In effect,
having prescribed the relevant constitutional rules, the Batson majority chal-
lenged the lower courts to take racial prejudice out of jury selection.
Several critics, most notably Justice Marshall, have charged that under Bat-
son the lower courts will be unable to end prosecutorial discrimination. Only by
prohibiting peremptory challenges entirely, they claim, can minorities be assured
freedom from discrimination injury selection. 16 Though these critics ultimately
may be correct that Batson cannot achieve its own goals and that a more drastic
solution is appropriate, such a conclusion is impossible to reach at this point.
Rather than use the decision as a blueprint for eliminating discriminatory jury
selection practices, some lower courts have tried to minimize the decision's im-
pact on the operation of the peremptory challenge. As a result, these courts
have required defendants to meet unduly high standards of prima facie proof.17
When defendants have been able to satisfy these standards, the courts routinely
have accepted prosecutors' explanations as sufficient to rebut the prima facie
case.18 In sum, lower courts have failed to implement fully the spirit, and in
some cases the letter, of Batson. Until they do, the debate will continue whether
aggressive application of Batson might solve the problem of jury selection dis-
crimination without resort to abolition of the peremptory challenge.
Illustrative of the incomplete implementation of Batson is the North Caro-
lina experience. Neither the North Carolina Supreme Court nor the North Car-
olina Court of Appeals ever has held for a defendant on the merits of a Batson
claim. 19 In part, this result is attributable to the courts' misapprehension of the
operation of the Batson prima facie evidentiary system.20 In part, it also arises
from the courts' undue deference to the findings of trial courts.2 1 As a result of
these misapplications of Batson, North Carolina has'yet to contribute meaning-
fully to the debate over the decision's continuing validity, much less to achieve
its nondiscrimination goal.
This Comment begins with a brief review of the common-law origin and
theoretical functions of the peremptory challenge, its introduction into the
American judicial system, and its reception by the legislature and courts of
15. Id. at 96-97.
16. Eg., id. at 102-05 (Marshall, J., concurring); Chew v. State, 71 Md. App. 681, 717, 527
A.2d 332, 350 (1987); Commonwealth v. Hardcastle, 519 Pa. 236, 261-64, 546 A.2d 1101, 1113-14
(1988) (Nix, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1169 (1990); Note, Batson v. Kentucky: A
Half Step in the Right Direction (Racial Discrimination and Peremptory Challenges Under the Heav-
ier Confines of Equal Protection), 72 CORNELL L. Rlv. 1026, 1039 (1987).
17. See infra notes 159-201 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 235-56 and accompanying text.
19. In one case, the supreme court found a procedural error and remanded the proceedings to
the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on Batson issues. See State v. Green, 324 N.C. 238, 240-41,
376 S.E.2d 727, 728 (1989).
20. See infra notes 159-89 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 276-83 and accompanying text.
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North Carolina. 22 Next, the Comment discusses the constitutional background
of Batson and reviews the Batson decision, paying particular attention to the
Court's goals and to the issues it left to state and lower federal courts.23 The
Comment then examines the North Carolina appellate courts' implementation
of Batson and shows that the courts have been true to neither the letter nor the
spirit of the decision. The Comment suggests doctrinal revisions that are better
suited to achieving Batson's goals.24 Many of these recommended procedures
and standards derive from the implementation of Batson in other states. The
Comment concludes that the North Carolina courts' unduly constrictive view of
Batson has rendered the decision ineffective in North Carolina. Therefore, revi-
sions are necessary to guarantee North Carolina criminal defendants and poten-
tial jurors equal protection of the laws.25
I. HIsToRicAL BACKGROUND: THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
The peremptory challenge has long been a part of the Anglo-American ju-
dicial process, although the degree to which it has been approved and employed
has varied. 26 It developed during the twelfth century, when the English jury
was transformed "from a body of fact knowers to one of fact finders."'2 7 The
new fact-finding system required jurors to determine the facts based not on per-
sonal favoritism, but on evidence presented in court. 28 The peremptory chal-
lenge evolved as one safeguard 29 of jury impartiality.30
In theory, peremptory challenges promote impartiality in three ways. First,
attorneys may use them to remove prospective jurors with suspected, but un-
provable, prejudice or bias. 31 Second, peremptory challenges facilitate the exer-
22. See infra notes 26-54 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 55-144 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 202-18, 261-74, 292, 313-16 and accompanying texts.
25. See infra text accompanying note 340.
26. Brown, McGuire & Winters, supra note 2, at 193; see Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-
13 (1965).
27. Gobert, The Peremptory Challenge-An Obituary, 1989 CRIM. L. REv. 528, 528; see 3. VAN
DYKE, supra note 2, at 2. Originally, jurors were chosen because they had some knowledge of the
facts and the parties. Gobert, supra, at 528. During the reign of Henry II (1154-89), the Crown
began to impanel men who had knowledge of the case to decide whether a suspect should be
charged. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 2. This system, analogous to the modem grand jury,
employed the first juries of fact-finders and provided the foundation for the modern jury. Id. at 2-3.
28. Gobert, supra note 27, at 528.
29. In addition to the peremptory challenge, two practices designed to promote impartial juries
developed. First, jurors were selected only from among those citizens thought capable of deciding
cases fairly and objectively. Id. Professor Alschuler has noted that these persons were an elite group
of propertied men. Alschuler, supra note 7, at 164-65. Second, the challenge for cause evolved
whereby the parties could remove from the panel an unlimited number of jurors with demonstrable
bias. Gobert, supra note 27, at 528. To this day, to exercise a challenge for cause attorneys must
"1assign cause" for the challenge; they must explain their reasons for believing the juror is partial and
the judge must agree. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 139-41.
30. Gobert, supra note 27, at 528.
31. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965); J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 146;Babcock, Voir Dire. Preserving "Its Wonderful Power" 27 STAN. L. Rev. 545, 551 (1975). More-
over, the peremptory challenge permits counsel to remove these jurors without embarrassing them
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cise of challenges for cause, which are themselves designed to remove biased
potential jurors.3 2 Third, the challenges foster the appearance of impartiality,
since the parties may dismiss without explanation jurors they perceive to be bi-
ased, whether or not the potential jurors are in fact biased . 33
Originally the Crown enjoyed an unlimited number of peremptory chal-
lenges. 34 In 1305, recognizing that this practice produced juries that were bi-
ased in favor of the prosecution, Parliament abolished the right of prosecutors to
exercise peremptory challenges. 35 It still, however, viewed peremptory chal-
lenges as necessary for defendants; accordingly, defendants retained the right to
remove jurors peremptorily. 36 Despite Parliament's command that prosecutors
challenge potential jurors only for cause, the English courts soon construed the
1305 statute to reinstate, in effect, the prosecutor's right to exercise peremptory
challenges. 3 7 The courts permitted the prosecutor to "stand aside" prospective
jurors and postpone assigning cause for his challenges. 38 The prosecutor had to
assign cause only if too few jurors remained to constitute a jury after the defend-
ant exercised his challenges. 39  Since this contingency rarely occurred, the
Crown effectively enjoyed the right to exercise peremptory challenges.40
Although early American courts and legislatures readily accepted the de-
fendant's right to exercise peremptory challenges as part of the common law, the
prosecutor's right was more uncertain.41 Some states permitted prosecutorial
peremptory challenges, but severely limited them in number.4 2 Other states did
not allow prosecutors to exercise peremptory challenges at all.43 It was not until
with public accusations of bias or with public revelation of their prejudices. Babcock, supra, at 553-
54; see Gobert, supra note 27, at 529-30.
32. An attorney often can uncover the prejudices of a prospective juror necessary to justify a
challenge for cause only by asking the juror probing and personal questions; the availability of per-
emptory challenges alleviates the attorney's fear of incurring a juror's hostility during this question-
ing, because the attorney knows that if he alienates a juror, he may strike the juror peremptorily.
Thus, the availability of the peremptory challenge prevents a chilling effect on the voir dire question-
ing that facilitates the challenge for cause. Swain, 380 U.S. at 219-20; Babcock, supra note 31, at
554-55.
33. This satisfies Justice Frankfurter's maxim that "justice must satisfy the appearance of jus-
flee." Ofutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954). By furthering the litigants' belief in the
system's impartiality, peremptory challenges also promote confidence in and respect for the criminal
justice system. See Babcock, supra note 31, at 552; Gobert, supra note 27, at 529.
34. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 147; Brown, McGuire & Winters, supra note 2, at 194;
Massaro, supra note 6, at 525. The defendant was permitted thirty-five peremptory strikes. 4 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *354.
35. The Ordinance of Inquests, 33 Edw., ch. 4 (1305). Furthermore, the unlimited number of
prosecutorial peremptory challenges subjected trials to substantial delays. See COKE ON LrrrLETON
156 (14th ed. 1791), quoted in Swain, 380 U.S. at 213.
36. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 147; Brown, McGuire & Winters, supra note 2, at 194.
37. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 213; J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 148; Brown, McGuire & Win-
ters, supra note 2, at 194.
38. Swain, 380 U.S. at 213; J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 148.
39. Swain, 380 U.S. at 213; J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 148.
40. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 148.
41. Id.; Brown, MeGuire & Winters, supra note 2, at 194; Massaro, supra note 6, at 525.
42. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 149. As late as 1856, the Supreme Court held that
prosecutors in federal court had no common-law right to engage in the practice of "standing aside."
United States v. Shackleford, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 588, 590 (1856).
43. The two most populous original states, New York and Virginia, did not allow prosecutors
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1870 that peremptory challenges for the prosecution became "the rule rather
than the exception." 44 By 1900 "the government's right to exercise peremptory
challenges was firmly established."
'45
North Carolina was among the first American jurisdictions officially to rec-
ognize the defendant's right to exercise peremptory challenges, the prosecutor's
right to "stand aside" prospective jurors, and the prosecutor's right to exercise
peremptory challenges. 46 In 1777 the North Carolina General Assembly codi-
fied common-law practice by granting capital defendants thirty-five peremptory
challenges. 47 Then, in 1829, the North Carolina Supreme Court formally ap-
proved the practice of "standing aside."48 Most dramatically, in 1827 the North
Carolina General Assembly broke with five centuries of English practice and
became one of the first state legislatures to allow prosecutors to exercise peremp-
tory challenges. 49
At first the North Carolina prosecutor's privilege existed only in capital
cases and was limited to four peremptory strikes,50 in sharp contrast to the de-
fendant's thirty-five peremptory challenges. 51 Throughout the twentieth cen-
tury, the North Carolina General Assembly periodically revised the number of
peremptory challenges exercisable by defendants and by the State, narrowing the
gap between the two sides.52 Finally, in 1977 the general assembly granted the
to exercise peremptory challenges in felony cases until 1858 and 1919 respectively. See Act of April
17, 1858, ch. 332, § 1, 1858 N.Y. Laws 557 (current version at N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW § 270.25
(McKinney 1982)); VA. CODE ANN. § 4898 (1919) (statutory revision pursuant to Act of March 8,
1918, ch. 108, 1918 Va. Acts 211) (current version at VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-262 (1990).
44. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 150; see Brown, McGuire & Winters, supra note 2, at 195.
45. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 150; see Brown, McGuire & Winters, supra note 2, at 195.
Several developments account for the eventual acceptance of prosecutorial peremptory challenges.
By the mid-nineteenth century, the mistrust of government that characterized the Revolutionary
period gave way to greater acceptance of state power. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 150. More-
over, in light of the growing heterogeneity in many American cities, the Supreme Court determined
that the government had a legitimate interest in exercising peremptory challenges to keep certain
"elements" offjuries. See Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70-71 (1887). Eventually the Court found
the right to exercise peremptory challenges to be inherent in the right to jury trial. See Lewls v.
United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892); Babcock, supra note 31, at 556.
46. See State v. Benton, 19 N.C. (2 Dev. & Bat.) 196, 204 (1836) (practice of standing aside
"has ... prevailed in the courts of this state"); J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 14849, 171 n.47.
47. Act of Nov. 15, 1777, ch. 2, § 94, J. IREDELL, LAWS OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
317 (1791) (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1217(a)(1) (1988)); see also State v. Arthur,
13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 217,220 (1829) (purpose of peremptory challenge is to ensure that the prisoner has
a jury "free from all objection"). The general assembly later extended the right to exercise peremp-
tory challenges to defendants not on trial for their lives. Act of Nov. 16, 1801, ch. 592, § 1, 2 H.
POTTER, LAWS OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 953 (1821).
48. Arthur, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 219.
49. Act of Nov. 19, 1827, ch. 10, 1827 N.C. Sess. Laws 15 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-1217 (1988)). Only four states authorized their governments to exercise peremptory chal-
lenges earlier than North Carolina: Delaware (1782), Pennsylvania (1813), Tennessee (1821), and
Georgia (1822). . VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 171 n.57.
50. 1827 N.C. Sess. Laws 15.
51. Id. In addition, the prosecutor had to exercise all of his peremptory challenges before he
tendered the prospective jurors to the defendant. Id.
52. See, eg., Act of Feb. 26, 1907, ch. 415, § 1, 1907 N.C. Sess. Laws 608 (current version at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1217(b)(2) (1988)) (allowing the State two peremptory challenges per de-
fendant in noncapital cases); Act of March 1, 1913, ch. 31, §§ 3, 4, 1913 N.C. Sess. Laws 55, 56
(current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1217 (1988)) (reducing defendants' peremptory chal-
lenges to twelve in capital cases and four in noncapital cases); Act of May 11, 1935, ch. 475, §§ 2, 3,
[Vol. 691538
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State the same number of peremptory challenges as the defendant.5 3 In equaliz-
ing the number of peremptory challenges allowed, the general assembly brought
North Carolina practice in line with that of most states.5 4 Unfortunately, dur-
ing the same period in which North Carolina prosecutors received this increased
power to exercise peremptory challenges, prosecutors around the country began
to use their peremptory challenges to deny racial minorities the opportunity to
serve on juries.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND: FROM STRAUDER TO SWAIN
In the wake of the Civil War, the American people ratified three constitu-
tional amendments whose common purpose was to secure equal rights for newly
freed black citizens.55 The second of these, the fourteenth amendment, prohibits
the states from denying any person "equal protection of the laws."' 56 One of the
earliest United States Supreme Court decisions construing the equal protection
clause did so in the context of jury selection.
In Strauder v. West Virginia57 a black man had been charged with mur-
der.5 8 At the time, West Virginia law authorized only white males to serve as
jurors.5 9 A state court rejected Strauder's claim that the statute denied him
equal protection of the laws; he was convicted by an all-white jury and his ap-
1935 N.C. Sess. Laws 834, 835 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1217 (1988)) (increasing
defendants' peremptory challenges from 12 to 14 in capital cases and from four to six in noncapital
cases; increasing State's peremptory challenges from four to six in capital cases and from two to four
for each defendant in noncapital cases); Act of March 11, 1971, ch. 75, § 1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 56
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-21(b) (1971)) (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-1217(a)(2) (1988)) (increasing State's peremptory challenges to nine in capital cases). The
general assembly abolished the practice of "standing aside" in 1913. Act of March 1, 1913, ch. 31,
§ 4, 1913 N.C. Sess. Laws 55, 56 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1217 (1988)); see State
v. Ashburn, 187 N.C. 717, 720-21, 122 S.E. 833, 834 (1924).
53. Act of June 23, 1977, ch. 711, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 853, 858 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-1217 (1988)). In capital cases today each defendant is entitled to 14 peremptory chal-
lenges and the State is entitled to 14 challenges per defendant; in noncapital cases, each defendant
may exercise six peremptory challenges and the State may exercise six challenges per defendant. In
selecting alternate jurors, each party may use any unused challenges plus one peremptory challenge
for each alternate juror to be selected. Id.
54. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1217 official commentary (1988). One possible explanation for
North Carolina's early acceptance of peremptory challenges for both parties in criminal cases is the
state's apparent tradition of allowing attorneys freedom in selecting juries. North Carolina trial
judges generally allow attorneys wide latitude in questioning jurors during the jury selection process.
R. PRICE, NORTH CAROLINA CRIMINAL TRIAL PRACTICE § 18-11, at 289 (1980); see also 2 G.
WILSON, NORTH CAROLINA CIVIL PROCEDURE § 47-3, at 121 (1989) ("trial judge must grant suffi-
cient leeway ... so that counsel can develop meaningful information"). Prior to 1977, attorneys
often were able to see the jury list, thus enabling them to shape the jury selection by altering their
strategy appropriately. DeMent, Jury Selection and the Criminal Jury Trial in Superior Court, in
NORTH CAROLINA ACADEMY OF TRIAL LAWYERs, PERSUASION AND THE ART OF ADVOCACY &
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-TRIAL AND APPEAL: NEW G.S. 15A, § 5, at 1 (1978). Indeed, in 1978,
seminar material from the North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers claimed that "control of jury
selection by the litigants is the rule." Id. at 4.
55. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1872).
56. The equal protection clause provides in part that "[n]o State shall... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
57. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
58. Id. at 304.
59. Id. at 305.
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peal eventually reached the Supreme Court.
6°
The Supreme Court agreed with Strauder that the West Virginia statute
contravened the equal protection clause. The Court explained that the purpose
of the equal protection clause is to end racial discrimination by state govern-
ments. 6 1 It found that the West Virginia statute discriminated against black
persons in two ways. First, the statute denied black defendants equal protection
by providing that they were to be tried by juries from which members of their
race had been purposely excluded, while entitling whites to juries selected from
persons of their own race.62 The Court held that although no defendant has a
right to a jury consisting of members of his race,63 a state may not summarily
deprive anyone of that possibility. 4 Second, the statute denied black prospec-
tive jurors equal protection by refusing them the privilege of participating
equally in the administration ofjustice.65 Strauder thus became a powerful pre-
cedent proscribing racial discrimination in jury selection.
Strauder was the first shot fired in a more than one-hundred-year war over
the extent of the equal protection clause's reach in regulating jury selection prac-
tices. Throughout the century following Strauder, the Court consistently reaf-
firmed the case's fundamental pronouncement outlawing jury selection
procedures that discriminate against racial minorities.66 Moreover, the Court
extended Strauder, which had involved a facially discriminatory statute, by for-
bidding the states from applying facially neutral statutes in a discriminatory
manner 67 and by prohibiting purposeful, substantial underrepresentation of mi-
60. Id. at 304.
61. Id. at 306-07, 310. The Court wrote:
What is [the meaning of the fourteenth amendment] but declaring that the law in the States
shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether [black] or white,
shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the [black] race, for whose
protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be made
against them by law because of their color?
Id. at 307. During the past 100 years, the Court has expanded this interpretation so that the equal
protection clause now protects against governmental discrimination on grounds other than race,
although the protection exists to different extents depending upon the identity of the protected
group. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 5, at §§ 14.11-.25; L. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTrrrUoNAL LAW §§ 16-23 to -31 (2d ed. 1988).
62. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309.
63. Id.; accord Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1879) (companion case to Strauder,
mere fact that black defendant was convicted by all.white jury did not warrant reversal when de-
fendant made no showing of racial discrimination); cf. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975)
(defendant not entitled to a jury of any particular composition).
64. See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309.
65. See id. at 308. The Court explained:
The very fact that [black] people are singled out and expressly denied by a statute all right
to participation in the administration of the law, as jurors, because of their color, though
they are citizens, and may be in other respects fully qualified, is practically a brand upon
them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race
prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice
which the law aims to secure to all others.
Id.
66. See, eg., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 492-93 (1977); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396
U.S. 320, 329 (1970); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 549-50 (1967); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S.
559, 561 (1953); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589 (1935).
67. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478-79 (1954); see Avery, 345 U.S. at 562-63 (although
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norities on jury lists. 68
Prior to 1965 the Court's equal protection-jury selection cases were limited
to claims of discrimination in the formation of jury pools. 69 As the Court struck
down states' discriminatory practices in this area and black persons finally were
included on jury lists, however, prosecutors found other ways to prevent black
persons from sitting on juries.70 One method prosecutors used was exercising
peremptory challenges at trial to strike black potential jurors from the venire.7 1
The Court addressed the constitutionality of this practice for the first time in
Swain v. Alabama.72
Swain, a black man, was charged with rape.73 At trial he moved to strike
the venire and to declare void the all-white jury, contending that both had been
chosen in a discriminatory manner. Specifically, Swain claimed that the prose-
cutor had exercised his peremptory challenges unlawfully against all of the black
persons on the venire. 74 The trial court denied Swain's motions and the Ala-
bama Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and death sentence. 75
The United States Supreme Court first dismissed Swain's argument that the
State intentionally excluded black persons from the jury pool. 7 6 The Court then
considered his claim that the prosecutor had exercised peremptory challenges
purposely to exclude all black persons from the jury in violation of the equal
protection clause. In its analysis, the Court recognized the inherent tension be-
tween peremptory challenges and the fourteenth amendment. It acknowledged,
on the one hand, that settled constitutional principles prohibiting racially dis-
criminatory state jury selection practices apply not only to discrimination in
selecting persons for jury service, but also to discrimination in selecting the ju-
rors in a particular case. 77 On the other hand, the Court noted that peremptory
challenges historically have been thought to facilitate the selection of fair and
impartial juries-both in fact and as perceived by the parties. 78 The Court con-
statute was facially neutral, State used different color record cards to identify black persons and to
make it easier for jury commissioners to avoid selecting blacks for jury service); Norris, 294 U.S. at
589-91 (despite statute permitting black persons to serve as jurors, no black person ever was called to
jury service); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 371-73, 394 (1881) (finding equal protection violation
when statute authorized only qualified voters to be jurors and state law prohibited black persons
from voting).
68. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 493; see Whitus, 385 U.S. at 550-51.
69. See, eg., Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 478-79; Avery, 345 U.S. at 561; Patton v. Mississippi, 332
U.S. 463, 464 (1947); Norris, 294 U.S. at 590-93.
70. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 150; Kuhn, supra note 12, at 283.
71. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 150; Kuhn, supra note 12, at 283.
72. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
73. Id. at 203.
74. See id. at 203, 205-06, 209-10.
75. Id. at 203.
76. Id. at 209. The Court noted that eight black persons had been on the venire and that Swain
failed otherwise to prove purposeful discrimination. Id. at 205-09.
77. See id. at 224 (holding that the peremptory challenge may not be used to deny black per-
sons the right and opportunity to participate in the administration of justice that white persons
enjoy).
78. Id. at 212-20. The sixth amendment guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a ... trial, by an impartial jury." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. For a
discussion of the history of the peremptory challenge and its adoption into the American legal sys-
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cluded that challenging black prospective jurors on account of race does not
necessarily violate the equal protection clause.79 Peremptory challenges, the
Court reasoned, are necessarily discretionary. To remove all jurors they believe
are biased, litigants must be permitted to exercise peremptory challenges on the
basis of prospective jurors' looks, gestures, habits, and group affiliations.80 This
principle holds true particularly in light of the limited knowledge litigants nor-
mally have about prospective jurors.81 Moreover, the Court explained, since all
persons are equally subject to being challenged peremptorily, black prospective
jurors are disadvantaged by peremptory challenges no more than white prospec-
tive jurors.82 The Court presumed that prosecutors use peremptory challenges
to obtain impartial juries, not because of racial animus. 83 Accordingly, it held
that a defendant can never prove an equal protection violation solely from the
prosecutor's peremptory challenges in his case.84 To give meaning to Strauder
and its progeny, however, the Court added that a defendant may prove an equal
protection violation by showing that the "prosecutor . . . in case after case,
whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or
victim may be, is responsible for" peremptorily striking all qualified black per-
sons.85 Such evidence would show that the prosecutor challenged members of
the defendant's race not to ensure an impartial jury, but rather to deny them
categorically and unconstitutionally the opportunity to serve as jurors.8 6
Swain's standard for proving a fourteenth amendment violation-system-
atic discrimination by the prosecutor over many cases-soon proved almost im-
possible for defendants to satisfy. In the twenty years following Swain, virtually
no defendants successfully challenged prosecutors' uses of peremptory chal-
lenges.87 The continuing practice of prosecutors peremptorily striking all or
most blacks caused the Supreme Court in 1986 to re-examine, in Batson, the
Swain standard of proof.
III. BATSON V. KENTUCKY
A. The Batson Opinions
James Kirkland Batson, a black man, was charged with second-degree bur-
glary and receipt of stolen goods.8 8 On the first day of his trial in a Kentucky
circuit court, the judge excused a number of jurors for cause and then permitted
tern, see supra notes 26-54 and accompanying text. For a discussion of how, in theory, the peremp-
tory challenge facilitates the selection of impartial jurors, see supra notes 31-33 and accompanying
text.
79. Swain, 380 U.S. at 221.
80. See id. at 220-21.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 221.
83. Id. at 222.
84. See id.
85. Id. at 223.
86. Id. at 224.
87. See McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1118 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Swain has led most courts to
reject all constitutional challenges to the prosecutor's alleged discriminatory use of peremptories.").
88. Batson, 476 U.S. at 82.
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the attorneys to exercise peremptory challenges.8 9 The prosecutor used his per-
emptory challenges to strike all four black persons on the venire.90 Batson's
counsel objected to the prosecutor's actions and moved to discharge the jury.9 1
He argued that striking the black persons violated Batson's sixth and fourteenth
amendment rights to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community92
and his fourteenth amendment right to equal protection of the laws.93 The trial
court denied the motion, and Batson was convicted by the all-white jury.94 The
Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed. 95 Relying on Swain, the court found that
Batson had neither alleged nor proved the prosecutor's systematic exclusion of
black persons.96 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and re-
versed Batson's conviction. 97
Justice Powell wrote for a seven-justice majority. Once again, the Court
reaffirmed the basic constitutional principle that the State may not engage in
racial discrimination when selecting juries. 98 "The harm from discriminatory
jury selection," Justice Powell remarked, "extends... to touch the entire com-
munity" by undermining public confidence in the fairness of the judicial sys-
tem. 99 The Court then overruled Swain's holding that a defendant can prove
unconstitutional discrimination only by showing systematic discrimination over
time. 100 The Court explained that the equal protection clause proscribes not
only those peremptory challenges that are motivated by racial animus, but also
those that are based on the patently erroneous assumption that members of the
defendant's race as a group are biased.10 1 This holding was a stark departure
from Swain, which had held expressly that group affiliations are constitutionally
proper bases for peremptory challenges. 102 Moreover, the Batson Court recog-
89. Id. at 82-83.
90. Id. at 83.
91. Id.
92. The sixth amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI. It is applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). The
Supreme Court has construed this clause to guarantee the defendant a jury drawn from a fair cross-
section of the community. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975).
93. Batson, 476 U.S. at 83.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 84.
96. Id. Batson did not press his equal protection claim in the Kentucky Supreme Court, appar-
ently conceding that he could not meet the Swain standard of systematic exclusion of blacks over
time. In analyzing Batson's sixth amendment claim, however, the Kentucky Supreme Court held
that the Swain standard also applied when the defendant alleged a fair cross-section violation as a
result of the prosecutor's peremptory challenges. Id. at 83-84.
97. Id. at 84.
98. Id. Batson never raised an equal protection claim in the Supreme Court. Rather, he relied
solely on the sixth amendment right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community.
Nevertheless, the majority declined to address the sixth amendment claim and reversed Batson's
conviction exclusively on equal protection grounds. This action spurred a vehement dissent from
Chief Justice Burger. See id. at 112-18 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 87.
100. Id. at 92-93.
101. See id. at 86.
102. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 221 (1965); supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
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nized that Swain's requirement of systematic discrimination over time saddled
defendants with a "crippling burden of proof" 10 3 while leaving prosecutors' per-
emptory challenges "largely immune from constitutional scrutiny."'1 4 The
Court held that defendants may prove equal protection violations from the per-
emptory challenges exercised in their cases alone.105
Justice Powell then announced the particular manner in which defendants
may prove discrimination. 106 Initially, the defendant must establish a prima
facie case of purposeful discrimination.10 7 The prima facie case has three ele-
ments. First, the defendant must be a member of a cognizable racial group and
the prosecutor must have exercised peremptory challenges against members of
that group.10 8 Next, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact that peremptory
challenges "permit[] 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discrimi-
nate.' "109 Last, the defendant must show that these facts and any other rele-
vant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used peremptory
challenges to remove prospective jurors on account of race.110 Once the defend-
ant establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to come
forward with "clear and reasonably specific" race-neutral reasons for the per-
emptory challenges under attack.11' This explanation need not rise to a level
that would justify a challenge for cause, but it must be more than an assertion of
good faith." 12 The defendant bears the ultimate burden of persuasion on the
issue of the prosecutor's purposeful discrimination.' 13
The Batson Court instructed that this burden-shifting evidentiary system
would operate in the same manner as the evidentiary system used in "disparate
treatment" employment discrimination cases under Title VII 114 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.115 Justice Powell already had explained the purpose of such
103. Batson, 476 U.S. at 92.
104. Id. at 93-94.
105. Id. at 95-98; see id. at 100-01 (White, J., concurring). Because the Court believed that the
peremptory challenge makes an important contribution to the justice system, however, it expressly
declined to abolish the challenge. Id. at 98-99 & n.22.
106. In formulating the standard of proof, the Court was guided by the general principle that
governmental action alleged to be discriminatory must be traced to a racially discriminatory pur-
pose. This requirement emerged from the Court's landmark equal protection cases of the 1970.. See
id. at 93 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976)).
107. See id.
108. Id. at 96 (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977)). Since 1986, the Court has
retreated from the position that the defendant and the challenged juror must be of the same race. In
1991, the Court held that a white defendant has standing to allocate peremptory challenges exercised
against members of other, constitutionally recognizable racial groups. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S, Ct.
1364, 1370, 1373 (1991).
109. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
110. Id.
I 11. Id. at 97-98 & n.20 (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
258 (1981)).
112. Id. at 97-98. A prosecutor may not claim simply that in her intuitive judgment the chal-
lenged jurors would be partial to the defendant because of their shared race. Id. at 97.
113. Id. at 94 n.18. Since the trial court's findings will turn largely on credibility evaluations, the
Court held, appellate courts should give those findings great deference. Id. at 98 n.21; see infra notes
277-83 and accompanying text.
114. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
115. Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 n.18 (citing United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens,
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a system in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine :116 it "serves to
bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to [the] ultimate ques-
tion"117 whether the party in question engaged in illegal discrimination. At is-
sue in discrimination cases is alleged improper intent or motivation. A person's
intent is difficult to prove by objective evidence. 118 Furthermore, the alleged
discriminating party naturally has superior access to proof of his own reasons
for the questioned conduct. By shifting the burden of coming forward to the
party whose actions are at issue once the complaining party provides threshold
prima facie evidence, the burden-shifting system provides persons alleging dis-
crimination with "the kind of detailed discovery that would make it possible for
them to prove illicit intent." 119 To effectuate this discovery purpose, Burdine
explicitly held that "[t]he burden of establishing a prima facie case... is not
onerous." 120 Likewise, therefore, the prima facie burden under Batson is not
burdensome. 121
Justice White, the author of Swain, concurred in the decision to overrule
Swain.122 That case, he explained, had been a warning that removing black
persons on the assumption that they could not judge black defendants fairly
would contravene the equal protection clause. 123 Since discriminatory peremp-
tory challenges remained widespread despite this warning, Justice White argued
that defendants, in appropriate cases, should have an opportunity to inquire into
prosecutors' reasons for challenging black potential jurors. 124
460 U.S. 711,714-15 (1983); see Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,252-56
(1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973)). Numerous lower courts
have interpreted Batson as relying on the Court's Title VII cases to explain the operation of the
burden-shifting rules. See, eg., People v. Harris, 129 Ill. 2d 123, 177, 184, 544 N.E.2d 357, 381, 384
(1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1323 (1990); Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 60, 542 A.2d 1267, 1271-72
(1988); Chisolm v. State, 529 So. 2d 635, 637 (Miss. 1988); State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 63 (Mo.
1987) (en banc), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988); State v. Porter, 326 N.C. 489, 497-98, 391 S.E.2d
144, 150 (1990).
116. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
117. Id. at 253.
118. See Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (shifting burdens of proof
under Title VII designed to assure that " 'plaintiff [has] his day in court despite the unavailability of
direct evidence'" of discriminatory intent (quoting Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (lst
Cir. 1979))); 2 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 50.10, at 10-6 (1990)
(employers are "too sophisticated to profess their prejudices on paper or before witnesses"); Blumoff
& Lewis, The Reagan Court and Title VIP A Common-Law Outlook on a Statutoiy Task, 69 N.C.L.
REV. 1, 9 (1990) (direct evidence of discriminatory intent is often unavailable).
119. Bartholet, Proof of Discriminatory Intent Under Title VII. United States Postal Service
Board of Governors v. Aikens, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1201, 1206 (1982); see also 2 A. LARSON & L.
LARSON, supra note 118, § 50.10, at 10-5 (prima facie case may be established from objective evi-
dence); E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 343, at 968 (3d ed. 1984) (one reason for having
burden-shifting presumptions is simple fairness, including situations in which opposing party has
superior means of access to proof).
120. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; accord, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186
(1989).
121. Stanley v. State, 313 Md. App. 50, 71, 542 A.2d 1267, 1277 (1988), cert. denied, 322 Md.
240, 587 A.2d 247 (1991); Blume, Racial Discrimination in the State's Use of Peremptory Challenges:
The Application of the United States Supreme Court's Decision in Batson v. Kentucky in South Caro-
lina, 40 S.C.L. REV. 299, 330 (1989).
122. Batson, 476 U.S. at 101 (White, J., concurring).
123. Id. (White, J., concurring).
124. See id. (White, J., concurring).
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Justice Marshall's concurrence was not nearly as approving of the majority
opinion as Justice White's. Although he did characterize the Court's opinion as
an "historic step toward eliminating the shameful practice of racial discrimina-
tion in the selection of juries," 125 Justice Marshall opined that Batson's new
standard of proof would not bring about the end of discrimination. 126 He feared
that prosecutors easily could evade Batson by proffering pretextual, facially non-
racial explanations that the courts could not second-guess. 127 Stressing that the
peremptory challenge is not of constitutional magnitude, Justice Marshall ar-
gued that the peremptory challenge should be banned entirely.1 28
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Rehnquist, Chief Justice Burger
also predicted that Batson would not eradicate discrimination in jury selec-
tion.129 The Chief Justice came to the opposite conclusion from Justice Mar-
shall, however, asserting that the peremptory challenge is essential to assure the
appearance of justice.130 He argued that since all groups are subject to the per-
emptory challenge in a given case, striking jurors because of group affiliation
does not violate the equal protection clause in the particular case.131 The Chief
Justice thus would have reaffirmed Swain and upheld Batson's conviction. 132
125. Id. at 102 (Marshall, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 102-05 (Marshall, J., concurring) (predicting that all but the most flagrant violations
of the rule would remain unassailable).
127. Id. at 105-06 (Marshall, 3., concurring).
128. Id. at 108 (Marshall, J., concurring). In addition to the concurring opinions by Justices
White and Marshall, Justice O'Connor wrote to argue that the decision should not be applied retro-
actively, see id. at 111 (O'Connor, J., concurring), and Justice Stevens wrote to justify the Court's
decision to resolve the case on equal protection grounds, even though Batson had not argued that
issue before the Court, see id. at 108-11 (Stevens, J., concurring).
129. The Chief Justice had several other criticisms of the majority's analysis and holding. He
doubted that prosecutors exercising peremptory challenges could meet the burden of providing neu-
tral explanations for their action. Batson, 476 U.S. at 129 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). He also was
skeptical that prosecutors could offer explanations somewhere between that required for a peremp-
tory challenge (no explanation) and that required for a challenge for cause; permitting any inquiry
into the basis for a peremptory challenge would "force 'the peremptory challenge [to] collapse into
the challenge for cause."' Id. at 127 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Clark, 737
F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1984)).
130. Id. at 120 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 122-23 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 118-31 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). In a separate dissenting opinion joined by Chief
Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist asserted the importance of the peremptory challenge as a part of
the system of trial by jury. He added that "[t]he use of group affiliations, such as age, race, or
occupation... based on the assumption or belief that members of one group are more likely to favor
defendants who belong to the same group, has long been accepted as a legitimate basis for the State's
exercise of peremptory challenges." Id. at 138 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist's argu-
ment that members of the defendant's race may be assumed to be biased in favor of the defendant,
however, even if true, cuts two ways. Consider, for example, the common case with a black defend-
ant and a white victim and prosecutor. Justice Rehnquist's theory states that black members of the
jury may be biased for the defendant. Consequently, the prosecutor should be permitted to remove
those black jurors peremptorily. Justice Rehnquist's argument necessarily implies, however, that
white persons may be assumed to be biased in favor of whites. It follows that the white jurors may
be assumed to be biased in favor of the victim and prosecutor, and against the defendant. Since in
most cases more white persons will be on the venire than black persons, the defendant will not be
able to remove as great a percentage of the whites as the prosecutor will be able to remove of the
blacks, and the result will not be an impartial jury, but rather one in which the "subtle group biases
of the majority... operate, while those of the minority [are] silenced." Commonwealth v. Soares,




Batson struck a new balance in the ongoing conflict between the equal pro-
tection clause and the peremptory challenge. It made clear that, despite nor-
mally being exercised in an arbitrary and capricious manner, the peremptory
challenge is subject to the strictures of the fourteenth amendment. 133 As a fed-
eral appeals court later remarked, the case's core principle is that " 'a defendant
[has] the right to be tried by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to
nondiscriminatory criteria.' "134 More specifically, Batson sought to provide a
more effective means than Swain of ensuring that members of racial minorities
are not excluded from juries on account of race. 135
The Court expressly refused, however, to specify the implementation of the
Batson evidentiary scheme. 136 Instead, it assigned to state and lower federal
290-91. Even if Justice Relmquist's assumption were true, therefore, it would operate in favor of
restrictions on the right to exercise peremptory challenges on the basis of race.
133. In a footnote, Justice Powell wrote: "The standard we adopt ... is designed to ensure that
a State does not use peremptory challenges to strike any black juror because of... race." Batson,
476 U.S. at 99 n.22. At least one commentator has criticized the Batson Court for seeking "to
manifest its symbolic opposition to racial discrimination while doing as little as possible to alter the
peremptory challenge." Alschuler, supra note 7, at 199. While it is possible that the subjective
intention of the Batson majority was simply to oppose racial discrimination symbolically, courts
must take the Supreme Court at its word when implementing the decision.
134. United States v. David, 803 F.2d 1567, 1570 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at
85-86). The court noted that Batson's command is to eliminate, not merely minimize, racial discrim-
ination in jury selection. Id. at 1571.
135. Commonwealth v. McCormick, 359 Pa. Super. 461, 474, 519 A.2d 442, 449 (1986).
136. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 & n.24. In addition to implementation issues, Batson left unan-
swered a panoply of questions regarding the scope of its application. For example, the decision did
not address whether the use of peremptory challenges against minorities may be attacked as a viola-
tion of the sixth amendment right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 84 n.4. Four years later, however, the Court held that the sixth amendment does
not forbid prosecutors from striking jurors on account of race. Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803,
811 (1990).
The Court also left unanswered what constitutes a "cognizable group" entitled to Batson pro-
tection. Lower courts have held that Hispanics are one such group. See, e.g., State v. Sandoval, 105
N.M. 696, 700, 736 P.2d 501, 505 (Ct. App. 1987); State v. Ramos, 574 A.2d 1213, 1216 (R.I. 1990);
State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 596 (Utah 1988). Native Americans are another. See, e.g., United
States v. Roan Eagle, 867 F.2d 436, 441 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1028 (1989); United States
v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1314 (10th Cir. 1987); State v. Porter, 326 N.C. 489, 499, 391 S.E.2d 144,
151 (1990). The courts have split, however, on whether women constitute a cognizable Batson
group. Compare United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1422 (9th Cir. 1990) (prohibiting per-
emptory challenges on the basis of gender) with State v. Oliviera, 534 A.2d 867, 870 (R.I. 1987)
(women not a cognizable group). See also People v. Blunt, 162 A.D.2d 86, 88-89, 561 N.Y.S.2d 90,
92 (1990) (state constitution's equal protection clause prohibits peremptory challenges on basis of
gender); Sagawa, Batson v. Kentucky: Will It Keep Women on the Jury?, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S
L.J. 14, 37-44 (1987-88) (arguing that Batson proscribes exclusion of women through peremptory
challenges).
The question whether white persons may assert Batson claims has arisen in two contexts. One
issue is whether white defendants have standing to challenge the striking of black prospective jurors.
Batson's language suggests that white persons have no such standing, since one of the elements of the
Batson prima facie case is that members of the defendant's race were struck. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
In 1991, however, the Court held that the defendant's race is irrelevant to the issue of standing to
raise an equal protection claim. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1370, 1373 (1991). The second
issue regarding the standing of white defendants is whether they may attack peremptory challenges
exercised against white jurors on account of race. The few courts that have addressed this question
have answered it in the affirmative. See Government of Virgin Islands v. Forte, 365 F.2d 59, 64 (3d
Cir. 1989); State v. Smith, 515 So. 2d 149, 150 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (dictum).
A hotly debated issue left unanswered by Batson is whether the defendant is precluded by the
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courts 13 7 the task of determining what evidence gives rise to a prima facie infer-
ence of discrimination and what prosecutorial explanations rebut a prima facie
case. 138 In effect, having laid down the relevant constitutional guidelines, the
Court challenged the lower courts to eradicate .discriminatory jury selection
practices.
One of the major side effects of Batson's evidentiary standard is that it fun-
damentally changes the prosecutorial peremptory challenge. By definition, per-
emptory challenges require no explanation. Thus, when prosecutors must give
reasons for their peremptory challenges, those challenges are no longer peremp-
tory. Lower courts implementing Batson can handle this consequence in several
ways. They can require a low threshold showing by the defendant to raise a
prima facie inference of discrimination, in which case prosecutors will have to
explain their challenges more often. They also can scrutinize prosecutors' rebut-
tal explanations closely, causing more prosecutorial challenges to be found un-
constitutional. Although the attack on discrimination might be successful, the
effect would be to sacrifice the peremptory challenge's peremptory nature. Al-
ternatively, the courts can require a high level of prima facie proof and not scru-
tinize prosecutors' proffered reasons so closely. Although this approach would
protect the peremptory challenge from serious intrusion, it might render Batson
no more effective than Swain in rooting out discrimination. One answer to this
apparent dilemma lies in the purpose of Batson: the Court specifically stated
that it intended to ensure that no state strikes any juror because of race. 139 Ar-
guably, therefore, lower courts should construe any doubt in favor of combating
discrimination, even at the expense of the peremptory challenge. By technically
permitting the implementing courts to operate within this range of options, Bat-
son's language gives these courts considerable power to define the extent to
which the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges and the peremptory chal-
Constitution from exercising peremptory challenges on the basis of race. In his Batson dissent, Chief
Justice Burger contended that "'[b]etween [the defendant] and the state the scales are to be evenly
held.'" 476 U.S. at 126 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70
(1887)). Thus, Batson also should apply to the defendant's discriminatory use of peremptory chal-
lenges. Id. at 125-26 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also Alschuler, supra note 7, at 197-98 (defend-
ants' peremptory challenges are "state actions" subject to the strictures of the fourteenth
amendment); Note, Discrimination by the Defense" Peremptory Challenges After Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 355, 365-68 (1988) (prosecutors should have third-party standing to
assert rights of jurors excluded by defendants). In 1990 New York became the first state to prohibit
racially motivated peremptory challenges by the defendant. See People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 650,
554 N.E.2d 1235, 1241, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647, 653, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 77 (1990). Some commenta-
tors have argued, however, that the defendant's use of peremptory challenges is not a "state action"
subject to the strictures of the fourteenth amendment. Goldwasser, Limiting a Criminal Defendant's
Use of Peremptory Challenges On Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal Trial, 102 HARV. L. REV,
808, 838 (1989); see Note, Defendant's Discriminatory Use of the Peremptory Challenge After Batson
v. Kentucky, 62 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 46, 57 (1987).
137. Although the equal protection clause by its terms applies only to actions of state govern-
ments, the right to equal protection, and thus Batson, applies to actions of the federal government
through the fifth amendment. United States v. Horsley, 864 F.2d 1543, 1544 n.2 (11th Cir. 1989)
(citing Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 364 n.4 (1974)).
138. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 & n.24. The Court cited the "variety of jury selection practices" in
state and federal trial courts as its reason for not dictating how to implement the decision. Id. at 99
n.24.
139. Id. at 97.
1548 [Vol. 69
CRIMINAL LAW
lenge itself survive. In short, the lower courts have become laboratories experi-
menting with whether and how the equal protection clause and the peremptory
challenge can coexist in the American judicial system.
Several critics have echoed Justice Marshall's opinion that the peremptory
challenge and the equal protection clause cannot coexist and have called for the
abolition of peremptory challenges as the only effective way of ending discrimi-
natory jury selection. 140 They have noted that "a prosecutor can easily assert
facially neutral reasons for striking a juror," thus rendering Batson's constitu-
tional protections illusory. 14 1 Before a sufficient number of lower courts apply
Batson rigorously, however, it would be premature to toss out the decision and,
with it, the eight-hundred-year old peremptory challenge. 142 As is evident from
North Carolina's experience, some states have failed to implement Batson ag-
gressively, instead adopting an unduly constricted view of the decision. 143 As a
result, the jury remains out on Batson, while defendants and prospective jurors
continue to suffer the invidious effects of racially discriminatory jury selection
practices. 44
IV. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BATsON IN NORTH CAROLINA
In his concurring opinion, Justice White predicted that "[m]uch litigation
[would] be required to spell out the contours of the Court's equal protection
holding."145 In the five years since Batson, state and federal courts have heard
literally hundreds of Batson claims. Nevertheless, no consensus has emerged on
how best to implement the decision. As a result, Batson's impact has varied
from state to state. In North Carolina, neither the supreme court nor the court
of appeals ever has found a prosecutor guilty of violating Batson.146 This section
examines how North Carolina has implemented the decision and considers why
no North Carolina defendant has won a Batson claim.
140. See Chew v. State, 71 Md. App. 681, 717, 527 A.2d 332, 350 (1987); Commonwealth v.
Hardcastle, 519 Pa. 236, 261-64, 546 A.2d 1101, 1113-14 (1988) (Nix, CJ., dissenting), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1169 (1990); Note, supra note 16, at 1039; see also Brown, McGuire & Winters, supra note
2, at 234 (prosecutor's peremptory challenges should be abolished); Massaro, supra note 6, at 560-63
(same); Note, The Use of Peremptory Challenges to Exclude Blacks from Petit Juries in Civil Actions:
The Case for Striking Peremptory Strikes, 4 REv. OF LITIGATION 175, 212-13, 215 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter Note, The Case for Striking Peremptory Strikes] (peremptory challenges should be abolished in
civil cases).
141. Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring); see Hardcastle, 519 Pa. at 261, 546 A.2d
at 1113 (Nix, C.J., dissenting); Note, supra note 16, at 1036-38.
142. See Note, Batson v. Kentucky and the Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge: Arbitrary and
Capricious Equal Protection?, 74 VA. L. Rv. 811, 818 (1988).
143. See Blume, supra note 121, at 300 (unduly restrictive view of Batson adopted in South
Carolina).
144. In his concurring opinion, Justice Marshall scolded that "[m]isuse of the peremptory chal-
lenge to exclude black jurors has become both common and flagrant." Batson, 476 U.S. at 103
(Marshall, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 102 (White, J., concurring).
146. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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A. The Prima Facie Case
Batson set forth the three elements of the prima facie case. The prosecutor
must have peremptorily challenged members of a cognizable racial group. Sec-
ond, the defendant may rely on the fact that the peremptory challenge is a device
susceptible to being used in a discriminatory manner. Third, the defendant must
show that these facts and "other relevant circumstances" raise an inference of
discrimination.147 The North Carolina Supreme Court and the North Carolina
Court of Appeals have dealt almost exclusively with the third element, and thus
this question: What facts and circumstances raise an inference of purposeful
discrimination? 148
The North Carolina appellate courts have identified several circumstances
that are relevant to this prima facie inquiry. Some of these circumstances tend
to support an inference of discrimination. They include a pattern of peremptory
challenges against black persons, use of a disproportionate number of challenges
against black persons, questions and remarks by the prosecutor during voir dire
that suggest racial animus, and the prominence of racial issues in the case. 149
Other circumstances the courts have recognized, in contrast, tend to refute an
allegation of discrimination. Those circumstances include the acceptance rate of
minority jurors by the State' 50 and the ultimate racial composition of the
jury.151
Only once, however, has a North Carolina appellate court found the cir-
cumstances of a case sufficient to raise a prima facie inference of discrimina-
147. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96; see supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
148. The North Carolina courts have not focused on the first element of the prima facie case
because only a few cases have considered Batson when the defendant was not black. See State v.
Porter, 326 N.C. 489, 499, 391 S.E.2d 144, 151 (1990) (Native Americans are racial group cogniza-
ble for Batson purposes); State v. Agudelo, 89 N.C. App. 640, 647-48, 366 S.E.2d 921, 925-26 (deny-
ing Hispanic defendant's Batson claim without deciding whether Hispanics are cognizable group),
disc rev. denied, 323 N.C. 176, 373 S.E.2d 115 (1988). The courts have not addressed the second
"element" of the prima facie case because it is merely a proposition upon which the defendant may
rely when attempting to show discrimination. It is not a fact to be established, and thus has gener-
ated no litigation.
149. See State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 99, 121, 400 S.E.2d 712, 724 (1991); State v. Porter, 326 N.C.
489, 498, 391 S.E.2d 144, 150-51 (1990); State v. Crandell, 322 N.C. 487, 502, 369 S.E.2d 579, 588
(1988); State v. Jackson, 322 N.C. 251, 255, 368 S.E.2d 838, 840 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110(1989); State v. Robbins, 319 N.C. 465, 490-91, 356 S.E.2d 279, 294-95, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918
(1987).
150. Smith, 328 N.C. at 121, 400 S.E.2d at 724. Prior to Smith the North Carolina Supreme
Court had held, in effect, that any time the State's acceptance rate of black potential jurors was 40%
or greater, then no prima facie inference of discrimination arose. See State v. Allen, 323 N.C. 208,
219, 372 S.E.2d 855, 862 (1988) (prosecutor accepted 41% of black prospective jurors), vacated on
other grounds, 110 S. Ct. 1463 (1990); Crandell, 322 N.C. at 502, 369 S.E.2d at 588 (prosecutor
accepted 50% of black prospective jurors); State v. Abbott, 320 N.C. 475, 481-82, 358 S.E.2d 365,
369-70 (1987) (prosecutor accepted 40% of black prospective jurors); State v. Belton, 318 N.C. 141,
159, 347 S.E.2d 755, 766 (1986) (prosecutor accepted 50% of black prospective jurors). This rule
was inconsistent with Batson because it permitted prosecutors to strike peremptorily up to 60% of
the minorities tendered virtually without fear of Batson consequences. Thus, by recognizing that the
acceptance rate of minorities by the State is relevant to, but not dispositive of, the prima facie in-
quiry, the Smith decision brought North Carolina practice in line with the dictates of the Batson
Court.




tion. 152 In State v. Smith,1 5 3 decided in 1991, the prosecutor struck twelve out
of the twenty-one black prospective jurors tendered to him. 154 He used his first
three peremptory challenges, six of his first seven, and twelve out of a total of
fifteen exercised, to remove black persons. 155 In addition, the case, which in-
volved an interracial killing, was so polluted with racial emotions that its venue
had been changed to another county.156 Most significantly, the prosecutor's re-
marks during jury selection suggested strongly that his peremptory challenges
were racially motivated. The district attorney complained that the defendant
had struck several white prospective jurors and then stated:
I submit to the Court that the State, the victim in this case is also
entitled to a fair representation of those jurors who are seated there.
The victim is white, they ought to have a fair representation as to the
number of black/white jurors that are on there, and at the rate that
we're going, we'll have-if it's any wish apparently of the defendant,
we'll have nine-nine/three or worse.157
The court held that the pattern of discrimination, the exercise of a dispropor-
tionate percentage of the State's challenges against black persons, the racially-
charged nature of the case, and the prosecutor's race-conscious remarks together
established a prima facie inference of discrimination. 158
The North Carolina appellate courts have found only this one blatant prima
facie case to have been established in the five years since Batson, primarily be-
cause they have misapplied the Batson rule by taking into account the voir dire
responses of challenged jurors when evaluating the strength of the prima facie
inference.1 59 State v. Robbins 160 illustrates this misapplication. In Robbins a
152. In some cases, trial courts have found that the defendant made out a prima facie case. See
infra note 224.
153. 328 N.C. 99, 400 S.E.2d 712 (1991).
154. Id. at 121, 400 S.E.2d at 724.
155. Id. at 123, 400 S.E.2d at 725.
156. Id. at 122, 400 S.E.2d at 725.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 123, 400 S.E.2d at 725. The court then found that the prosecutor adequately rebutted
the prima facie case, and thus was not guilty of aBatson violation. Id. at 126-27, 400 S.E.2d at 727-
28.
159. Another way in which the North Carolina Supreme Court has misapplied the Batson prima
facie case is by holding that the racial composition of the impaneled jury mirroring the racial compo-
sition of the county in which the trial took place is relevant evidence refuting an allegation of dis-
crimination. See State v. Belton, 318 N.C. 141, 159, 347 S.E.2d 755, 766 (1986); see also Smith, 328
N.C. at 124, 400 S.E.2d at 726 (ultimate racial makeup of jury relevant to determination that Batson
not violated); State v. Porter, 326 N.C. 489, 500, 391 S.E.2d 144, 152 (1990) (fact that jury mirrored
racial composition of county is relevant to determination that Batson not violated). The relationship
between the racial composition of the jury and the racial composition of the county is relevant only
to the question whether the defendant was tried by a jury made up of a cross-section of the commu-
nity. The right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community is guaranteed by the sixth
amendment. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975). Batson, however, is grounded solely
on the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause, which prohibits any discriminatory peremp-
tory challenge regardless of the racial composition of the eventual jury. Indeed, the Supreme Court
has held that the racial composition of the jury is irrelevant to Batson. See Alvarado v. United
States, 110 S. Ct. 2995, 2996 (1990) (per curiam) (reversing decision of court of appeals, which had
denied Batson claim on ground that the jury chosen satisfied the sixth amendment fair cross-section
concept).
160. 319 N.C. 465, 356 S.E.2d 279, cerL denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987).
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black man was charged with first degree murder, robbery with a firearm, and
kidnapping.161 Of the seventy-six potential jurors questioned during voir dire,
twenty-one were black. 162 The state challenged ten of the black persons for
cause because of their unequivocal opposition to the death penalty,163 and the
trial court excused two blacks on its own motion. 164 The prosecutor then exer-
cised peremptory challenges against seven of the nine remaining black prospec-
tive jurors.' 65 An all-white jury convicted Robbins and sentenced him to
death. 16 6
On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected Robbins's conten-
tion that the prosecutor's striking seven black potential jurors established a
prima facie inference of discrimination. The court first emphasized that judges
must consider "all relevant circumstances" when determining whether prima
facie cases exist. 167 The fact that the jury was composed entirely of white per-
sons, the court held, did not necessarily imply discrimination. 168 Moreover, the
court noted that the prosecutor had examined all potential jurors in the same
manner; nothing in his questions or statements indicated a discriminatory mo-
tive. 169 Most significantly, however, the court relied on facts that the challenged
jurors themselves had revealed in response to voir dire questioning: three of
them had reservations about their ability to impose the death penalty; one was
related to some of the defense witnesses; and two had been exposed to some
pretrial publicity.' 70 The court found that these facts dispelled any possible in-
ference that the prosecutor struck the prospective jurors because of their race. 171
Considering the challenged jurors' voir dire responses when deciding
whether a prima facie inference of discrimination exists has been a common
practice of the North Carolina appellate courts. In every such case, the courts
161. Id. at 481, 356 S.E.2d at 289.
162. Id. at 491-92, 356 S.E.2d at 295.
163. The racial implications of jury selection are magnified in capital cases for two reasons.
First, studies have shown that race is an important factor in the imposition of the death penalty;
black defendants who kill white victims have the greatest likelihood of being sentenced to death. See
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1987). Second, statistically, black persons oppose capital
punishment more often than do whites. See THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 85 (H. Bedau 3d
ed. 1982); Goldberg, Toward Expansion of Witherspoon: Capital Scruples, Jury Bias, and Use of
Psychological Data to Raise Presumptions in the Law, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 53, 62 (1970). As
a results, blacks are at a greater risk of being removed for cause on those grounds. See Darden v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 175 (1986) (absolute moral opposition to death penalty valid grounds for
challenge for cause in capital case); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986) (same).
164. Robbins, 319 N.C. at 492, 356 S.E.2d at 295.
165. Id. The defendant peremptorily challenged one black potential juror; the other black per-
son sat as an alternate juror in the case. Id.
166. Id. at 491, 356 S.E.2d at 295.
167. Id. at 489, 356 S.E.2d at 293 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97).
168. Id. at 494-95, 356 S.E.2d at 297.
169. Id. at 493-94, 356 S.E.2d at 296.
170. See id. The courts cited similar voir dire responses in rejecting prima facie cases in State v.
Davis, 325 N.C. 607, 619, 386 S.E.2d 418, 424 (1989) (potential juror held reservations about impos-
ing death penalty), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2587 (1990); State v. Aytche, 98 N.C. App. 358, 365, 391
S.E.2d 43, 47 (1990) (potential juror previously convicted of manslaughter); and State v. Batts, 93
N.C. App. 404, 409, 378 S.E.2d 211, 213 (1989) (potential juror knew members of defendant's family
and attended school with defendant's brother).
171. Robbins, 319 N.C. at 494, 356 S.E.2d at 296.
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have held that the facts disclosed by the jurors refuted any possible inference of
prosecutorial discrimination. Thus, for example, no inference of discrimination
has arisen when voir dire questioning revealed that the challenged black jurors
previously had been convicted for nonsupport and writing bad checks; 172 that
the potential juror had served on a jury within the previous four years;1 7 3 that
she had worked with youth who had drug and alcohol problems;'17" that she had
a "hard look on her face"; 175 and, in a case in which the defendant was twenty
years old, that the juror had three grown children.17 6
By factoring in the challenged jurors' voir dire responses, North Carolina
courts have confused facts that are relevant only to the prosecutor's rebuttal
with facts that are relevant to the prima facie case. For example, in determining
whether an inference of discrimination arose in Robbins, the court took into
account statements by one challenged juror who had said she was related to
some of the defense witnesses, two who had said they had been exposed to pre-
trial publicity, and one who had expressed reservations about imposing the
death penalty. 177 These are not circumstances surrounding the disputed per-
emptory challenges, but are merely possible reasons why the prosecutor might
have challenged the jurors. The distinction between the circumstances sur-
rounding the prosecutor's peremptory challenges and the prosecutor's possible
reasons for those challenges is crucial because, according to Batson, courts are
supposed to consider only the circumstances surrounding the challenges at the
prima facie stage; the prosecutor is supposed to proffer her reasons for the chal-
lenges once the defendant has established a prima facie case. 178
The circumstances surrounding the prosecutor's peremptory challenges
consist of the prosecutor's handling of the jury selection, and the conditions that
characterize the jury selection and the case itself. Specifically, they include the
manner in which the prosecutor questioned prospective jurors, the racial compo-
sition of the jury, the pattern of the prosecutor's peremptory challenges, and the
172. Batts, 93 N.C. App. at 409, 378 S.E.2d at 213.
173. Davis, 325 N.C. at 619, 386 S.E.2d at 424.
174. Id.
175. State v. Melvin, 99 N.C. App. 16, 30, 392 S.E.2d 740, 748 (1990).
176. Davis, 325 N.C. at 619, 386 S.E.2d at 424.
177. State v. Robbins, 319 N.C. 465, 492, 356 S.E.2d 279, 295, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987);
see supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
178. In Tolbert v. State, 315 Md. 13, 553 A.2d 228 (1989), the Maryland Court of Appeals
stated: "What reasons a prosecutor may advance for his challenges are not relevant to a prima facie
showing vel non. It is the 'circumstances' concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges
which may create a prima facie case of discrimination against black jurors ... ." Id. at 18, 533 A.2d
at 230. See also People v. Trevino, 39 Cal. 3d 667, 692 n.26, 704 P.2d 719, 733 n.26, 217 Cal. Rptr.
652, 666 n.26 (1985) (en bane) ("It is neither the function nor the duty of the trial courts, or the
appellate courts on review, to speculate as to prosecutorial motivation .... "); People v. Harris, 129
Ill. 2d 123, 184, 544 N.E.2d 357, 384 (1989) ("court should not presume, or infer from the facts of
the case, that an unarticulated neutral explanation exists"), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1323 (1990);
Raphael, Discriminatory Jury Selection: Lower Court Implementation of Batson v. Kentucky, 25
WILLAMETrE L. R V. 293, 315 (1989) ("Most courts consider the prosecutor's reasons for chal-
lenges only after a prima facie case has been established."). This is not to say that prosecutors'
possible reasons for exercising the questioned peremptory challenges are irrelevant to whether the
prosecutors violated Batson; indeed, Batson violations ultimately turn on the prosecutors' motivation
for striking the prospective jurors. Rather, the argument is merely that such reasons are irrelevant
to determining whether a prima facie case of Batson discrimination exists.
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racial overtones of the case.179 The potential reasons for the prosecutor's chal-
lenges, in contrast, are the substantive statements that prospective jurors reveal
during voir dire, and any characteristics of the prospective jurors that might
cause the prosecutor to strike the jurors.180 They might include, for example,
the fact that the juror previously had been a criminal defendant or that the juror
is related to the defendant.
A hypothetical situation illustrates further the distinction between "circum-
stances" and "reasons." Suppose ten black prospective jurors are on the venire.
Assume further that nothing in the prosecutor's questions or statements during
jury selection suggests racial animus; the prosecutor, however, exercises peremp-
tory challenges against all ten black jurors. These events and conditions are the
circumstances surrounding the prosecutor's peremptory challenges. The prose-
cutor's apparently evenhanded conduct during the voir dire is a circumstance
weighing against an inference of discrimination; contrarily, the overwhelming
pattern of challenges against black jurors is a circumstance weighing in favor of
an inference of discrimination. If the trial judge finds an inference of discrimina-
tion, under Batson the prosecutor then must show that the peremptory chal-
lenges were not racially motivated. To do that, the prosecutor might explain
that she removed the jurors not because of their race, but because, in response to
voir dire questioning, the jurors indicated that they were related to the defend-
ant, had reservations about the death penalty, had been exposed to pretrial pub-
licity, or the like. These responses would be the prosecutor's reasons for the
challenges.
Taking into account at the prima facie stage what would normally be the
prosecutor's rebuttal reasons is contrary to the letter of Batson and seriously
compromises Batson's ability to provide defendants with an effective means of
proving discrimination. The language of Batson specifically commands that
prosecutors provide legitimate reasons for their peremptory challenges once de-
fendants establish a prima facie case.181 If the lower courts consider prosecu-
tors' potential reasons before the prosecutors state those reasons themselves, this
command becomes meaningless.
More importantly, taking prosecutors' anticipated reasons into account at
the prima facie stage prevents the proper functioning of the Batson prima facie
case.182 As noted above, Batson's burden-shifting evidentiary system requires
179. The "relevant circumstances" that the Robbins court listed as examples all fit this descrip-
tion. See Robbins, 319 N.C. at 490-91, 356 S.E.2d at 294-95 (pattern of strikes against blacks; strik-
ing of disproportionate number of blacks; questions and remarks by prosecutor; fact that victim and
defendant are of different races; racial issues bound up with the conduct of the trial). For a listing of
other "circumstances," see infra notes 190-201 and accompanying text.
180. See infra notes 235-51 and accompanying text. Indeed, the purpose of questioning jurors is
to alert the attorneys to facts that might cause the attorneys to challenge the juror.
181. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
182. The term "prima facie case" has several connotations. In one sense, it is the burden on the
party asserting a claim or affirmative defense to produce enough evidence to permit the jury to
decide the issue. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2494, at 379 (Chad-
bourne rev. 1981). The standard of proof for this type of prima facie case is evidence sufficient to
permit a reasonable juror to find the material facts asserted. E. CLEARY, supra note 119, § 338, at
953. In another context, "prima facie case" denotes the establishment of a rebuttable presumption
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that prosecutors explain their allegedly discriminatory actions upon a mere
threshold showing by the defendant. It does not require the defendant to estab-
lish her prima facie case with evidence of actual discriminatory intent on the
prosecutor's part.183 The purpose of this system is to provide the defendant
with the hard-to-obtain information she needs to prove a discriminatory prose-
cutor's illicit intent.18 4 To effectuate this purpose, the prima facie burden is not
onerous. 185 In fact, a Pennsylvania court has held expressly that "in a close case
it is prudent for a court to err on the side of finding a prima facie case and
requiring a neutral explanation."' 186 The North Carolina courts' practice of con-
sidering prosecutors' potential rebuttal explanations at the prima facie stage is
inconsistent with this type of prima facie case in several respects. Most obvi-
ously, it makes establishing prima facie cases much more difficult than if the
court does not take those facts into account. The potential reasons for prosecu-
tors' peremptory challenges are facts that necessarily weigh against an inference
of discrimination. Accordingly, when courts consider those facts at the prima
facie stage, defendants must produce more affirmative evidence of discrimination
to overcome the suggestion of nondiscrimination that the possible reasons
evoke.187 Furthermore, Batson proscribes all peremptory challenges that are ac-
tually racially motivated-not merely those for which no possible legitimate ex-
planation exists. When a court rejects a prima facie case on the basis of the
prosecutor's potential reasons for the disputed challenges, however, the court
upholds the prosecutor's peremptory challenges based not on what actually mo-
tivated the prosecutor, but on what the court believes the prosecutor reasonably
could have (and indeed would have) asserted as the reasons for the challenges,
had he been asked. No one knows whether the prosecutor would have offered
those, or any, credible reasons for the challenges in question."8 ' Finally, even if
that requires the opposing party to come forward with some answer to the prima facie case. 9 J.
WIGMORE, supra, § 2494, at 379. "Prima facie case" in the Batson context is the latter type. Cf.
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.- Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 n.7 (1981) ("prima facie case" in
Title VII cases denotes rebuttable presumption).
183. See supra notes 107-21 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1314 (10th Cir. 1987) (striking single
juror may be sufficient); State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 22 (Fla.) (any doubt whether defendant has
met his initial burden should be resolved in his favor), cert denied, 487 U.S. 1219 (1988); Stanley v.
State, 313 Md. App. 50, 71, 542 A.2d 1267, 1277 (1988) (Batson prima facie showing threshold is
"not an extremely high one-not an onerous burden to establish"), cert. denied, 322 Md. 240, 587
A.2d 247 (1991); see also Blume, supra note 121, at 330 (prima facie case may be established on
minimal evidence in order to allow reasonable inquiry into defendant's claims). The lower prima
facie threshold does not materially disadvantage the prosecutor, because the weaker prima facie case
presumably is easier to rebut. See Gamble v. State, 257 Ga. 325, 327, 357 S.E.2d 792, 795 (1987).
186. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 386 Pa. Super. 29, 52, 562 A.2d 338, 349 (1989), appeal denied,
525 Pa. 631, 578 A.2d 926 (1990).
187. This result is antithetical to the burden-shifting evidentiary system employed in Batson,
which specifically recognizes and attempts to compensate for objective evidence of discriminatory
intentions being difficult to obtain. See 2 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 118, § 50.10, at 10-6
("Employers are.., too sophisticated to profess their prejudices on paper or before witnesses."); E.
CLEARY, supra note 119, § 343, at 968 (burden-shifting presumptions may be used when opposing
party has superior access to the proof).
188. For example, it is possible that, if required to explain their peremptory challenges, prosecu-
tors who strike jurors on account of race would not say that the juror had been exposed to pretrial
publicity or was connected somehow to the defendant. Rather, the prosecutor might offer some
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the prosecutor would have proffered the facts revealed during the voir dire as the
reasons for the peremptory challenges, considering those "reasons" without re-
quiring the prosecutor to state them deprives the trial court of the opportunity
to evaluate the prosecutor's credibility.18 9 Thus, courts cannot possibly evaluate
whether the facts revealed by the challenged jurors genuinely motivated the
prosecutor's peremptory challenges or whether the prosecutor would have as-
serted them merely as pretexts for discrimination.
Numerous circumstances are relevant to the question whether an inference
of discrimination exists, but do not constitute possible reasons for disputed per-
emptory challenges. The North Carolina Supreme Court already has recognized
many of them.190 These circumstances include the disproportionate removal of
minorities;191 the nature of the crime;192 the presence of racial issues in the
case; 193 disparate treatment of prospective jurors who are similar in all relevant
respects except race; 194 and whether the prosecutor failed to question minority
jurors, questioned them only perfunctorily, or questioned them differently from
nonminorities.19 5 Not all of the circumstances that are relevant to the inference
of discrimination tend to prove discrimination, however. The manner in which
the prosecutor conducts jury selection, for instance, is a circumstance that may
weigh against an inference of discrimination. 196
Illustrative of circumstances that tend to negate an inference of discrimina-
tion is State v. Davis.197 In Davis the potential jurors entered the courtroom
separately for voir dire and the attorneys examined each one individually. 198 As
a result, the prosecutor did not know how many minority persons were on the
other explanation that more plainly would be a pretext for discrimination. Under North Carolina
practice this situation is not likely to get past the prima facie stage; the trial judge would be permit-
ted to assume incorrectly that the prosecutor struck the juror because of the exposure to pretrial
publicity or the connection to the defendant and not because of race.
189. This practice is inconsistent with Batson, which noted that "the trial judge's findings...
largely will turn on evaluation of credibility." Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21.
190. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
191. See, eg., Exparte Branch, 526 So. 2d 609, 622 (Ala. 1987); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377
Mass. 461, 490, 387 N.E.2d 499, 517, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); State v. Robbins, 319 N.C.
465, 490-91, 356 S.E.2d 279, 294, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987).
192. United States v. Clemons, 843 F.2d 741, 748 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 835 (1988).
193. Id. (race of the defendant and the victim are relevant circumstances).
194. United States v. Horsley, 864 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11th Cir. 1989); Branch, 526 So. 2d at 623.
195. Branch, 526 So. 2d at 623; People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 282, 583 P.2d 748, 764, 148
Cal. Rptr. 890, 906 (1978); Slappy v. State, 503 So. 2d 350, 355 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987), aff'd, 522
So. 2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 (1988).
Other examples of circumstances relevant to the prima facie case include the following: the fact
that the only characteristic the challenged jurors shared was race, see Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 280, 583
P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905; Jackson v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 176, 184, 380 S.E.2d 1, 5,
aff'd on rehearing, 9 Va. App. 169, 384 S.E.2d 343 (1989) (en banc); Note, supra note 142, at 824;
and the fact that the challenged jurors had characteristics or a background ordinarily thought
favorable to the prosecution, such as having been a crime victim or a police officer, see People v.
Turner, 42 Cal. 3d 711, 719, 726 P.2d 102, 106, 230 Cal. Rptr. 656, 660 (1986).
196. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
197. 325 N.C. 607, 386 S.E.2d 418 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2587 (1990).
198. Id. at 620, 386 S.E.2d at 424. Under North Carolina jury selection procedures, the trial
judge in a capital case may permit prospective jurors to be sequestered before and after selection.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1214(j) (1988); R. PRICE, supra note 54, § 18-4, at 283.
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venire, or whether the next persons called would be minorities. 199 Three of the
first four jurors seated were black.20 0 Because the prosecutor accepted the three
black jurors at the beginning of the selection process when he did not know how
many blacks remained in the jury pool, the North Carolina Supreme Court
found that the circumstances suggested that the black persons the prosecutor did
remove peremptorily were not struck on account of their race.20 1 The court
properly found no prima facie case, because the circumstances surrounding the
prosecutor's peremptory challenges substantially refuted the defendant's claim
of discrimination. By considering only prima facie stage circumstances such as
these, and not possible explanations for the prosecutor's peremptory challenges,
the courts can adhere to Batson's letter and subserve, rather than subvert, the
purposes of the Batson prima facie case.
Given that the North Carolina courts should not consider the prosecutor's
potential reasons for disputed peremptory challenges at the prima facie stage,
the question remains: What circumstances are sufficient to raise a prima facie
inference of discrimination? Ordinarily, courts will weigh the totality of the rel-
evant circumstances to determine if a prima facie inference exists. The North
Carolina courts, however, reasonably can promote Batson's goal of easing the
evidentiary burden on defendants trying to prove discrimination by focusing on
one question in particular: whether prosecutors exercised peremptory chal-
lenges disproportionately against minority prospective jurors. In Smith and
Robbins the supreme court acknowledged that disproportionate strikes against
minorities were relevant to a prima facie inference of discrimination. 20 2 Like
most appellate courts, however, the North Carolina Supreme Court has not indi-
cated how trial courts should determine disproportionate effect, and how much
weight the trial courts should give it when evaluating the prima facie case.
An excellent illustration of the application of a disproportionate effects test
is the Massachusetts case of Commonwealth v. Soares.20 3 In Soares the prosecu-
tor exercised peremptory challenges against thirty-two white prospective jurors,
thirty-four percent of the white persons available.204 The prosecutor challenged
199. Davis, 325 N.C. at 620, 386 S.E.2d at 424.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. State v. Robbins, 319 N.C. 465,490, 356 S.E.2d 279, 294, cerL denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987);
accord United States v. Johnson, 873 F.2d 1137, 1140 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 304
(1990); Ex parte Branch, 526 So. 2d 609, 623 (Ala. 1987); Ward v. State, 293 Ark. 88, 92, 733
S.W.2d 728, 730 (1987); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 386 Pa. Super. 29,49 n.5, 562 A.2d 338, 348 n.5
(1989), appeal denied, 525 Pa. 631, 578 A.2d 926 (1990); Williams v. State, 712 S.W.2d 835, 841
(rex. Crim. App. 1986).
203. 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979). Massachusetts was one
of a handful of states that, prior to Batson, had prohibited the discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges on state constitutional grounds. The evidentiary methodology these states employed to
prove state constitutional violations was substantially the same as that employed in Batson. See id.
at 486-88, 387 N.E.2d at 516-17; People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 276-78, 583 P.2d 748, 761-63,
148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 903-04 (1978); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481, 486 (Fla. 1984); State v. Crespin, 94
N.M. 486, 488, 612 P.2d 716, 718 (Ct. App. 1980); People v. Thompson, 79 A.D.2d 87, 106-10, 435
N.Y.S.2d 739, 752-55 (1981).
204. Soares, 377 Mass. at 473 & n.7, 387 N.E.2d at 508 & n.7.
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only twelve black prospective jurors.205 Because only thirteen black persons
were available on the venire, however, this number amounted to ninety-two per-
cent of the available blacks. 206 Thus, although the prosecutor struck more than
two-and-one-half times as many whites as blacks (thirty-two as compared to
twelve), the impact of the peremptory challenges was two-and-one-half times as
great upon the black prospective jurors as upon the whites (ninety-two percent
removed as compared to thirty-four percent removed). The court held that the
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges had a disproportionate impact on the
black potential jurors.207 It concluded that the disparity suggested a possible
discriminatory motivation and thus justified an inquiry into the prosecutor's rea-
sons for his challenges. 208
The Soares test, comparing the percentage of minorities removed, with the
percentage of nonminorities removed, is useful for many reasons. First, it is
highly relevant; whether the prosecutor uses peremptory challenges to remove a
significantly greater percentage of minorities than nonminorities has a direct log-
ical bearing on the strength of an inference that race motivated the use of those
challenges. Second, it possesses a built-in control against the danger of pure
statistics carrying too much weight in the prima facie determination. If the dis-
parity between the percentages of blacks and whites challenged is striking, then
statistics will play a greater role; if the disparity is small, statistics will have little
probative value on the issue of discrimination.2°9 Third, the test can be applied
in every case. Consequently, it reduces the possibility of arbitrary decisions,
since the supreme court routinely may impose it as a limitation on the trial
court's otherwise nearly unfettered discretion to decide what circumstances are
relevant to the prima facie case. Fourth, it is an objective test. As a result, it is
amenable to appellate review. 210 Fifth, it helps guard against discriminatory
prosecutors who leave a few minority jurors on the jury to insulate their other,
race-based strikes.211 Most important, the disproportionate effects test com-
ports with the purpose and function of the Batson prima facie case. The test is
not onerous. It permits the defendant and the court to draw preliminary infer-
ences of discrimination from the information available to the defendant. It thus
facilitates the exposure of the prosecutor's illicit motives by providing enough
evidence to justify requiring the prosecutor to explain her reasons for the dis-
205. Id. at 473, 387 N.E.2d at 508.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 490, 387 N.E.2d at 517.
208. Id.; see also Gamble v. State, 257 Ga. 325, 326, 357 S.E.2d 792, 794 (1987) (disparity of
23.8 percentage points between proportion of blacks on jury panel and proportion of blacks on jury
sufficient to show discriminatory effect).
209. Some courts have noted the significance of statistics in jury selection discrimination cases.
See Aldridge v. State, 258 Ga. 75, 78-79, 365 S.E.2d 111, 114 (1988); cf McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279, 294-95 (1987) (dictum) (statistics have greater role in jury selection discrimination cases
than in cases regarding the discriminatory impact of the death penalty).
210. See infra note 292 and accompanying text.
211. Racially motivated prosecutors who strike a number of minority jurors but leave one or two
on the jury will not necessarily be insulated from Batson because the percentage of minority jurors
struck will be high.
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puted peremptory challenges. 2 12
The most difficult aspect of the disproportionate effects test is determining
what degree of disparity gives rise to a prima facie inference of discrimination.
Batson implied that disproportionate effect, like any other relevant circum-
stance, would be just one factor in the prima facie inquiry; the required degree of
disparity, therefore, ordinarily should depend on the other circumstances sur-
rounding the peremptory challenges in dispute. To bring about Batson's goals
more effectively, however, the North Carolina Supreme Court should determine
a threshold disparity above which a prima facie case automatically is estab-
lished. A threshold figure recognizes that when prosecutors strike minorities at
a certain substantially greater rate than they strike whites, the risk of an uncon-
stitutional motive is substantial enough to further the inquiry by having the
prosecutors explain their challenges, regardless of the absence of other evidence
of discrimination.
Support for a per se disproportionate effects criterion comes from three
states-Connecticut, Missouri, and South Carolina. Each of these states has
adopted Batson procedures whereby the prosecutor must explain her peremp-
tory challenges any time the defendant raises a Batson claim and demonstrates
that he belongs to a cognizable group from which persons were challenged pe-
remptorily.213 These procedures avoid difficult case-by-case evaluations of the
circumstances and ensure consistency.2 14 More importantly, they advance the
inquiry into the prosecutor's motivations.2 15 Although these procedures are not
required by Batson,2 16 they further the purposes of the Batson prima facie case
212. See supra notes 114-21 and accompanying text; see also Note, supra note 142, at 823
('[B]oth the prosecution and the defendant are likely to have better access to evidence on the issue of
intent" if the Batson claim is heard at trial rather than after appellate review.).
213. See State v. Holloway, 209 Conn. 636, 645-46, 553 A.2d 166, 171-72, cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1071 (1989); State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 64 (Mo. 1987) (en bane), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017
(1988); State v. Jones, 293 S.C. 54, 57-58, 358 S.E.2d 701, 703 (1987). But see United States v.
Montgomery, 819 F.2d 847, 851 (8th Cir. 1987) (Batson does not require specific mathematical
formula); State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 21 (Fla.) (rejecting bright-line test), cerL denied, 487 U.S.
1219 (1988); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 176, 183, 380 S.E.2d 1, 4 (same), aff'd on
rehearing, 9 Va. App. 169, 384 S.E.2d 343 (1989) (en bane). In Holloway and Jones the courts
simply held that to promote the goals of Batson more effectively trial courts should require the
prosecutor to explain her peremptory strikes whenever the defendant is a member of a cognizable
racial group and the prosecutor exercises peremptory challenges to remove members of that racial
group. See Holloway, 209 Conn. at 646, 553 A.2d at 171-72; Jones, 293 S.C. at 57, 358 S.E.2d at 703.
In Antwine the court noted that, as a practical matter, determining whether an inference of discrimi-
nation exists requires the court to consider the prosecutor's explanation of the manner in which she
employed her challenges. Therefore, the court directed trial judges to consider the prosecutor's
explanation as part of the process of determining whether a defendant has established a prima facie
case. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d at 64. Although this method confuses the separate questions of the
prima facie case and the prosecutor's rebuttal, it has the effect of requiring a prosecutorial explana-
tion whenever the defendant raises a Batson issue.
214. Jones, 293 S.C. at 57, 358 S.E.2d at 703.
215. As the Connecticut Supreme Court wrote: "[B]ecause [the Batson] issue is of such vital
importance to our real and perceived adherence to the rule of law... in all. . . cases in which the
defendant asserts a Batson claim, we deem it appropriate for the state to provide ... a... response
consistent with the explanatory mandate of Batson." Holloway, 209 Conn. at 645-46, 553 A.2d at
171-72.
216. Batson mentioned that a "'pattern' of strikes against black jurors" was merely illustrative
of the circumstances that courts could consider when evaluating the prima facie case. Batson, 476
U.S. at 97.
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by providing defendants with a practical way to get to the next stage of the
evidentiary scheme. While these procedures suffer from the drawback of permit-
ting defendants to hunt for Batson claims without providing any evidence of
discrimination other than the fact that the prosecutor struck members of their
race,217 the North Carolina courts can modify them to avoid this problem. By
requiring that there be a specified degree of disproportionate effect before a
prima facie case arises, the North Carolina courts can take advantage of the
benefits of these procedures while avoiding their flaws. The self-executing na-
ture of this approach would advance the inquiry into the prosecutor's motives
and promote consistency. The requirement of a significant disparity, however,
would make it difficult for the defendant to fish for Batson claims. Therefore,
the North Carolina courts should hold that a prima facie case of Batson discrim-
ination is established whenever the prosecutor strikes minorities at a rate a spe-
cific number of times greater than the rate at which he strikes whites.218 When
the prosecutor strikes minorities at a rate lower than the threshold comparison
figure, the percentage of minorities struck would be just one relevant circum-
stance considered.
B. The Prosecutor's Rebuttal
Once the defendant raises a prima facie inference of discrimination, the bur-
den shifts to the prosecutor to come forward with race-neutral explanations for
the disputed peremptory challenges. 219 Assessing prosecutors' explanations is
arguably the most difficult aspect of Batson for the courts,220 given the ease with
which prosecutors can offer facially neutral reasons for their peremptory chal-
lenges.221 Because attorneys normally may exercise peremptory challenges for
any reason, the peremptory challenge is "uniquely suited to masking discrimina-
tory motives."' 222 Batson's success at this stage, therefore, depends largely on
courts adequately scrutinizing prosecutors' proffered reasons to determine
whether those reasons are genuine or merely pretexts for discrimination.223
The North Carolina Supreme Court has defined the role of the trial courts
in evaluating prosecutors' rebuttals.224 The trial court must " 'satisfy itself that
217. See Note, supra note 142, at 823.
218. See Williams v. State, 712 S.W.2d 835, 841 (rex. Crim. App. 1986) (striking disproportion-
ate number of minority persons so as to render minority representation on the jury impotent can be
enough to make out a prima facie showing).
219. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97; State v. Porter, 326 N.C. 489, 497, 391 S.E.2d 144, 150 (1990).
220. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 105 (Marshall, J., concurring).
221. Id. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
222. State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 20 (Fla.), cert denied, 487 U.S. 1219 (1988); see Batson, 476
U.S. at 96 (peremptory challenge permits those who want to discriminate to do so).
223. See Raphael, supra note 178, at 318 ("'Rubber stamp' approval of all nonracial explana-
tions... would cripple Batson's commitment .... ) (quoting State v. Butler, 731 S.W.2d 265, 268
(Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Gamble v. State, 257 Ga. 325, 327, 357 S.E.2d 792, 794 (1987)).
224. The North Carolina appellate courts have reached the issue of the prosecutor's rebuttal in
several ways. In some cases, the trial court found that the defendant established a prima facie case.
See State v. Jackson, 322 N.C. 251, 253, 368 S.E.2d 838, 839 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. I110
(1989); State v. Sanders, 95 N.C. App. 494, 498, 383 S.E.2d 409, 412, disc. rev. denied, 325 N.C. 712,
388 S.E.2d 470 (1989); State v. Cannon, 92 N.C. App. 246, 252, 374 S.E.2d 604, 608 (1988), rev'd on
other grounds, 326 N.C. 37, 387 S.E.2d 450 (1990). In one case the prosecutor waived argument on
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the explanation is genuine"' by undertaking a "'sincere and reasoned attempt
to evaluate [it].' ",225 This inquiry requires appraising both the race-neutrality of
the explanation and the prosecutor's credibility in proffering the explanation.
The court "should take great care to assure that [the prosecutor's] reasons are
bona fide and not simply 'sham excuses belatedly contrived.' -226 Trial judges'
determinations should reflect the circumstances of the case, their knowledge of
trial techniques, and their observations of the way in which the prosecutor con-
ducted jury selection. 227 Finally, the court should consider the offered explana-
tion in light of the strength of the prima facie case.
228
The North Carolina courts also have identified factors specifically for as-
sessing the genuineness of prosecutors' explanations. Trial courts should con-
sider the susceptibility of the case to racial discrimination and should make note
of the races of the defendant, the victim, and key witnesses.229 The ultimate
racial composition of the jury is also relevant, though not dispositive.230 In ad-
dition, trial courts should factor in whether the prosecutor appeared to deliber-
ate carefully before exercising the peremptory challenges in question. 23 1 Last,
trial courts should evaluate the given reasons themselves. 232 These factors are
similar to those recognized in other states. 233 The supreme court has made
whether a prima facie case existed and explained the reasons for his challenges. See State v. Porter,
326 N.C. 489, 499, 391 S.E.2d 144, 151 (1990). In another case the trial court assumed, without
deciding, that the prima facie ease was established, and then considered the prosecutor's explanation.
See State v. McNeill, 326 N.C. 712, 719, 392 S.E.2d 78, 82 (1990). Finally, in a few cases the
prosecutors explained their challenges, notwithstanding that the trial court did not find that the
defendants had established prima facie cases. See State v. McNeil, 99 N.C. App. 235, 241, 393
S.E.2d 123, 126 (1990) (although not required, State articulated the reasons for its peremptory chal-
lenges); State v. Aytche, 98 N.C. App. 358, 365, 391 S.E.2d 43, 47 (1990) (prosecutor explained
challenges when asked to do so by the defendant); State v. Attmore, 92 N.C. App. 385, 397, 374
S.E.2d 649, 657 (1988) (court requested, but did not require, that the prosecutor explain peremptory
challenges because of vague possibility of future Batson claim), disc. rev. denied, 324 N.C. 248, 377
S.E.2d 757 (1989). Since in all of these cases the prosecutors proffered explanations for their per-
emptory strikes, the sole issue before the appellate courts was the sufficiency of those explanations.
In addition, in one case the supreme court found that the defendant established a prima facie case,
and thus proceeded to consider the prosecutor's reasons for the disputed peremptory challenges.
State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 99, 124, 400 S.E.2d 712, 726 (1991).
225. Sanders, 95 N.C. App. at 499, 383 S.E.2d at 412-13 (quoting People v. Hall, 35 Cal. 3d 161,
167, 672 P.2d 854, 858, 197 Cal. Rptr. 71, 75 (1983)).
226. Id. at 500, 383 S.E.2d at 413 (quoting Jackson, 322 N.C. at 260, 368 S.E.2d at 843 (Frye, J.,
concurring)).
227. Id. at 499, 383 S.E.2d at 413; see Porter, 326 N.C. at 498, 391 S.E.2d at 151.
228. Porter, 326 N.C. at 498-99, 391 S.E.2d at 151.
229. Id. at 498, 391 S.E.2d at 150-51.
230. State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 99, 124, 400 S.E.2d 712, 726 (1991). For a criticism of the court's
holding that the racial makeup of the defendant's jury is relevant to Batson, see supra note 159.
231. Porter, 326 N.C. at 498, 391 S.E.2d at 151. Deliberation may tend to show that the prose-
cutor did not have a predetermined intention to strike minorities, but instead made an individualized
decision to strike the juror based on the juror's overall characteristics.
232. Id.
233. Other states have also recognized several other factors central to evaluation of the suffi-
ciency of the prosecutor's rebuttal, including whether the prosecutor failed to strike white persons
who had the same characteristics as the challenged minority jurors, see People v. Hall, 35 Cal. 3d
161, 168, 672 P.2d 854, 858, 197 Cal. Rptr. 71, 76 (1983) ("strongly suggestive of bias"); Slappy v.
State, 503 So. 2d 350, 355 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987), aff'd, 522 So. 2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487
U.S. 1219 (1988), and whether the proffered reasons were vague and inherently subjective and the
prosecutor failed to probe sufficiently to determine if the juror was actually biased. See People v.
Turner, 42 Cal. 3d 711, 727, 726 P.2d 102, 111-12, 230 Cal. Rptr. 656, 665-66 (1986) (good faith of
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clear, however, that no one determinant necessarily demonstrates pretext:
"[r]arely will a single factor control the decision-making process."234
In applying these guidelines, the North Carolina appellate courts have al-
ways found the prosecutor's explanations adequate to rebut the prima facie case.
Two cases, State v. Jackson 235 and State v. Porter,236 aptly illustrate the variety
of reasons that the courts have held sufficient. In Jackson the prosecutors had to
justify four peremptory challenges exercised against black persons.237 They first
explained generally that the State had certain criteria for selecting jurors: stabil-
ity, pro-government orientation, steady employment, ties to the community, and
"a mind-set... that would... pay more attention to the needs of law enforce-
ment than the fine points of individual rights. ' 238 They then revealed the rea-
sons for striking each of the four black prospective jurors. Two of the jurors
were unemployed. 239 One of these jurors had "answered [the prosecutors] hesi-
tantly and... appeared indifferent or hostile about.., being a member of a jury
or indifferent or hostile to [the prosecutors]." 240 The other had been a student
counselor at Shaw University; the prosecutors felt that her background and de-
meanor indicated that she was "too liberal." 24 1 The third black prospective ju-
ror was a law student at the University of North Carolina and had been taught
by professors of "somewhat liberal views."'242 The fourth juror had a son of
approximately the same age as the defendant; although the juror also had a
daughter the same age as the victim, the prosecutors feared that she would iden-
tify with the defendant and not the prosecution. 24 3 The supreme court held that
the prosecutors' stated criteria for choosing a jury were legitimate and approved
the prosecutor's explanations.244
In Porter the state peremptorily challenged ten Native Americans.24 5 The
prosecutor required follow-up question that quickly would have clarified the matter); People v. Har-
ris, 129 Ill. 2d 123, 188, 544 N.E.2d 357, 386 (1989) (courts should assess the extent of State's efforts
to discover the unknown information), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1323 (1990).
234. Porter, 326 N.C. at 501, 391 S.E.2d at 152; see State v. Jackson, 322 N.C. 251, 257, 368
S.E.2d 838, 841 (1988) (recognizing that nonchallenged white persons had same characteristics as
challenged black persons, but noting that additional factors distinguished them), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1110 (1989).
235. 322 N.C. 251, 368 S.E.2d 838 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110 (1989).
236. 326 N.C. 489, 391 S.E.2d 144 (1990).
237. Jackson, 322 N.C. at 252-53, 368 S.E.2d at 839.
238. Id. at 253, 368 S.E.2d at 840. In a concurring opinion, however, Justice Frye warned
against the danger of abuse of such stated criteria or "profiles." Id. at 260, 368 S.E.2d at 843 (Frye,
J., concurring).
239. Id. at 253, 368 S.E.2d at 839; see also State v. Sanders, 95 N.C. App. 494, 501, 383 S.E.2d
409, 414 (juror had worked three jobs in previous ten months), disc, rev. denied, 325 N.C. 712, 388
S.E.2d 470 (1989).
240. Jackson, 322 N.C. at 253, 368 S.E.2d at 839; see also State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 99, 125, 400
S.E.2d 712, 727 (1991) (jurors appeared "nervous" and "uncertain"); State v. McNeil, 99 N.C. App.
235, 241, 393 S.E.2d 123, 126 (1990) (juror seemed "unsure of himself"); Sanders, 95 N.C. App. at
501, 383 S.E.2d at 414 (juror had "headstrong and overbearing personality").
241. Jackson, 322 N.C. at 253, 368 S.E.2d at 839.
242. Id.
243. Id.; see also Smith, 328 N.C. at 125, 400 S.E.2d at 726 (jurors had sons of approximately the
defendant's age).
244. Jackson, 322 N.C. at 256-57, 368 S.E.2d at 841.
245. State v. Porter, 326 N.C. 489, 499, 391 S.E.2d 144, 151 (1990).
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prosecutor proffered reasons for each challenge. Many of the challenged jurors
knew one or both of the defense attorneys.2 46 Several of the prospective jurors
previously had been prosecuted for driving while intoxicated.247 The employ-
ment histories of others reflected unemployment or irregular employment.248
Two seemed to believe that racism was present in the case.249 One prospective
juror "made constant eye contact with defense counsel, had majored in sociol-
ogy, and read Rolling Stone magazine." 250 On appeal, the supreme court af-
firmed the trial court's acceptance of these reasons as legitimate nonracial
criteria for challenging the Native Americans.251
The wide range of explanations that the North Carolina courts have found
sufficient to rebut a prima facie case illustrates the difficulties courts face in ap-
plying this part of the Batson evidentiary system. Prosecutors easily can proffer
facially neutral reasons for their peremptory challenges. All of the reasons the
prosecutors asserted in Jackson and Porter are facially race-neutral and thus
technically proper under Batson.252 Many of them, however, are completely
subjective and difficult to disprove. The Jackson court, for instance, accepted
the explanation that a challenged juror "appeared indifferent or hostile;"2 5 3 sim-
ilarly, the Porter court found sufficient the explanation that the challenged juror
"made constant eye contact with defense counsel."'254 Furthermore, several of
the reasons that the courts have accepted appear nonracial, but actually may be
a proxy for race. In Jackson the prosecutor excused one prospective juror be-
cause she had been a student counselor at Shaw University-a black university.
In Porter the court accepted the prosecutors' assertions that several of the black
prospective jurors had histories of unemployment or unsteady employment; the
unemployment rate for black persons in North Carolina is more than twice that
246. The challenged prospective jurors were acquainted with the defendant's lawyers as a result
of prior representation, being schoolmates, being a student of one of the lawyers, being related by
marriage, or being social acquaintances. Id. at 499, 391 S.E.2d at 151; see also Smith, 328 N.C. at
125, 400 S.E.2d at 727 (juror had "earlier association" with defense counsel); State v. McNeill, 326
N.C. 712, 719, 392 S.E.2d 78, 82 (1990) (juror knew defendant, though had not seen him in five
years); State v. McNeil, 99 N.C. App. 235, 241, 393 S.E.2d 123, 126 (1990) (juror knew proposed
defense witness); State v. Cannon, 92 N.C. App. 246, 252-53, 374 S.E.2d 604, 608 (1988) (five of six
challenged jurors connected to defendant, defendant's family, or a state witness), rev'd on other
grounds, 326 N.C. 37, 387 S.E.2d 450 (1990).
247. Porter, 326 N.C. at 499, 391 S.E.2d at 151; see also Smith, 328 N.C. at 125, 400 S.E.2d at
727 (State's victim-witness coordinator thought juror had a nephew "in trouble with drugs"); Mc-
Neil, 99 N.C. App. at 241, 393 S.E.2d at 126 (jurors had prior convictions for driving under the
influence, had been falsely accused of crime, or had relatives on probation); State v. Aytche, 98 N.C.
App. 358, 365, 391 S.E.2d 43, 47 (1990) (juror previously convicted of manslaughter); Cannon, 92
N.C. App. at 253, 374 S.E.2d at 608 (juror recently fined for traffic violation, although claimed to be
innocent).
248. Porter, 326 N.C. at 499, 391 S.E.2d at 151.
249. Id. at 500, 391 S.E.2d at 152.
250. Id. This potential juror also previously had been a witness for the defendant's attorney in a
different case. Id.
251. Id.
252. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
253. State v. Jackson, 322 N.C. 251, 253, 368 S.E.2d 838, 839 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. II10
(1989).
254. Porter, 326 N.C. at 500, 391 S.E.2d at 152.
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for white persons.25 5 As Justice Marshall warned: "If such easily generated
explanations are sufficient to discharge the prosecutor's obligation to justify his
strikes on nonracial grounds, then the protection erected by the Court... may
be illusory,"'2 56 because only the most flagrant and explicit Batson violations
would be caught.
The courts implementing Batson thus face this question: Which party
should bear the burden of overcoming the difficulty of evaluating the genuine-
ness of prosecutors' explanations? The courts generally have two choices. On
the one hand, the courts can put this burden on defendants and accept all
facially nonracial explanations. On the other hand, they can put the burden on
prosecutors and reject certain facially neutral reasons that are particularly sus-
ceptible to abuse as pretexts. Accepting all facially nonracial explanations is
supported by the literal language of Batson, which requires only that prosecutors
proffer "neutral explanation[s]." 257 This approach also would minimize the in-
trusion on the prosecutor's right to exercise peremptory challenges, since all per-
emptory challenges for which the prosecutor can offer a neutral explanation-
effectively most of them-would be acceptable. This tactic, however, would fa-
cilitate prosecutorial efforts to hide discriminatory motives and evade Batson's
constitutional proscription. Rejecting certain facially neutral reasons, alterna-
tively, better effects Batson's ultimate purpose of eradicating racially motivated
peremptory challenges. It would snare more racially motivated peremptory
challenges and have a greater deterrent effect on future discriminatory chal-
lenges. This alternative, however, would seriously intrude on the prosecutorial
peremptory challenge. Courts nationwide have responded differently to this ap-
parent quandary.258
Batson implicitly furnishes an answer to the dilemma: the State should bear
the burden of Batson's inherent weaknesses and courts should be slow to accept
prosecutorial explanations for which there is a high risk of abuse, even though
such an approach threatens the traditional, capricious nature of the peremptory
challenge. First, by creating a system that requires prosecutors to explain their
255. According to recent statistics from the U.S. Department of Labor, the unemployment rate
for blacks in North Carolina in 1989 was 6.3% while the unemployment rate for North Carolina
whites was only 2.8%. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTIcS, NORTH CAROLINA
UNEMPLOYMENT IN 1989 (Press Release, May 11, 1990).
256. Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
257. Id. at 97.
258. Compare United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1010-11 (5th Cir. 1987) (intuitive nonra-
cial reasons are sufficient); United States v. Allen, 666 F. Supp. 847, 853 (E.D. Va. 1987) (same),
aff'd sub nor. United States v. Harrell, 847 F.2d 138 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 488 U.S. 944 (1988);
People v. Young, 128 Ill. 2d 1, 20, 538 N.E.2d 453, 457 (1989) (juror's demeanor acceptable basis for
peremptory challenge), cerL denied, 110 S. Ct. 3290 (1990); State v. Manuel, 517 So. 2d 374, 376
(La. Ct. App. 1987) (same) and Porter, 326 N.C. at 500, 391 S.E.2d at 152 (failure to make eye
contact with prosecutor and excessive eye contact with defense counsel acceptable reasons for per-
emptory challenge) with United States v. Clemons, 843 F.2d 741, 745 (3d Cir.) ("intuitive judgment"
not sufficient), cert denied, 488 U.S. 835 (1988); United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1314 (10th
Cir. 1987) (explanation that State struck juror "based upon his background and other things in his
questionnaire" insufficient); State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 23-24 (Fla.) (must be support in the
record for the reasons given), cert denied, 487 U.S. 1219 (1988) and Commonwealth v. Jackson, 386
Pa. Super. 29, 55, 562 A.2d 338, 350 (1989) (abuse of discretion to accept explanation not supported
by record), appeal denied, 525 Pa. 631, 578 A.2d 926 (1990).
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peremptory challenges, Batson expressly sanctions intrusion on the traditional
arbitrary use of peremptory challenges. Furthermore, the Batson decision was
rooted in the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment; its primary
goal of ending discriminatory jury selection practices, unlike the peremptory
challenge, is thus of constitutional magnitude. 25 9 Most importantly, the.Batson
Court specifically noted that the purpose of the evidentiary system it set forth is
"to ensure that a state does not use peremptory challenges to strike any black
juror because of his race."'2 60 The Court itself thus stressed the predominance of
the nondiscrimination purpose of the decision. In short, the purpose and consti-
tutional basis of Batson require that lower courts do more than satisfy them-
selves that prosecutorial explanations are race neutral; rather, they must
scrutinize the explanations closely to ensure in a practical way that the explana-
tions are not pretexts. This is not because these explanations are technically
improper under Batson, but because they are peculiarly susceptible to being
abused by prosecutors. The North Carolina courts, which in the past have read-
ily accepted even highly subjective prosecutorial explanations, therefore should
revise their approach to conform with this view, which is more in accordance
with Batson's spirit and purpose.
A reasonable, practical way to implement this closer scrutiny is to require
prosecutors to support their peremptory challenges with other on-the-record
reasons whenever their stated explanations involve a substantial risk of being
pretextual. 26 1 Several types of prosecutorial explanations are so susceptible to
abuse that heightened scrutiny of this sort is warranted. One such type involves
reasons that may be proxies for racial animus.262 Professor Raphael has noted,
for example, that because a substantial percentage of black persons live in areas
of high crime or in segregated areas, explanations based upon the challenged
juror's connection with such areas easily may mask underlying discrimina-
tion.263 Likewise, reasons that apply disproportionately to minorities, such as
unemployment, or previous study at a predominately black university, may be
facially neutral substitutes for race-based reasons.264 The second type of
prosecutorial explanation justifying greater scrutiny includes reasons that apply
equally to white prospective jurors whom the prosecutor did not strike.2 65 The
North Carolina Supreme Court already has recognized that disparate treatment
259. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 108 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Frazier v. United States,
335 U.S. 497, 505 n.11 (1948); United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145 (1936); and Stilson v.
United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919)).
260. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.22 (emphasis added); see also United States v. David, 803 F.2d
1567, 1571 (11th Cir. 1986) (Batson's command is "to eliminate, not merely to minimize, racial
discrimination in jury selection.").
261. See Blume, supra note 121, at 332 ("[C]ourts should be extremely reluctant to accept gen-
eral and vague reasons for striking a juror, such as the juror was 'sullen,' 'distant,' or 'looked
mean. ").
262. See State v. Jackson, 322 N.C. 251, 260, 368 S.E.2d 838, 843 (1988) (Frye, J., concurring)
(court must remain alert to colloquial euphemisms for prejudice), cert. denied, 4.90 U.S. 1110 (1989);
Alschuler, supra note 7, at 175; Raphael, supra note 178, at 322.
263. Raphael, supra note 178, at 322.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 241, 248.
265. See, eg., People v. Hall, 35 Cal. 3d 161, 168, 672 P.2d 854, 858, 197 Cal. Rptr. 71, 76
(1983) (disparate treatment "strongly suggestive of bias"); Raphael, supra note 178, at 323 ("Courts
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of white and minority jurors is a factor for evaluating pretext. 26 6 The third and
most important type of prosecutorial explanation that involves a substantial dan-
ger of being used as a pretext is the vague and highly subjective explanation. 267
This type of explanation is the most difficult for the trial judge and defendant to
verify because the substance of the explanation does not appear in the record
and thus is impossible to review on appeal. 268 Hence, they are the explanations
most susceptible to prosecutorial chicanery. Whenever prosecutors submit one
of these types of explanations, the court should not find the explanation suffi-
cient unless there are some other reasons for the peremptory challenge that are
observable from the record.
Several courts, including those in Florida and Pennsylvania, require that at
least some evidence appear in the record to support the prosecutor's explana-
tions.2 69 Furthermore, some authority calls for requiring objective justifications
for prosecutors' usually discretionary actions when a danger exists that the pros-
ecutors acted unconstitutionally. Prosecutors normally have discretion to de-
cide what charges to bring against a suspect. When a prosecutor adds charges
against a defendant who has successfully appealed his conviction, however, a
danger arises that the prosecutor does so in retaliation for the defendant having
taken the appeal.270 Such conduct, if so motivated, would violate the defend-
ant's right to due process of law.27 1 Because the prosecutor's motives are com-
are most likely to reject a prosecutor's explanations... when the prosecutor failed to challenge other
jurors who were not of defendant's race yet who shared the same characteristic. .. ").
266. State v. Porter, 326 N.C. 489, 501, 391 S.E.2d 144, 152 (1990). The court qualified this
acknowledgement, however, by noting that prosecutors rarely exercise peremptory challenges on the
basis of one reason alone. Id. Of course, the court was correct in asserting that multiple reasons
often underlie peremptory challenges. Nevertheless, disparate treatment is so suggestive of racial
motivation that it warrants greater scrutiny.
267. State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 99, 125, 400 S.E.2d 712, 727 (1991); State v. Jackson, 322 N.C.
251, 253, 368 S.E.2d 838, 839 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110 (1989); see supra notes 252-56 and
accompanying text.
268. In Smith the supreme court held that "nervousness or uncertainty in response to counsel's
questions may be a proper basis for a peremptory challenge." Smith, 328 N.C. at 126, 400 S.E.2d at
727. The court then found that "the record supports the... conclusion that the reasons given by the
district attorney were not pretextual." Id. The court thus suggested that the appellate courts can
adequately evaluate the prosecutor's bona fides in proffering vague and subjective explanations.
How the record can support a finding that a juror was "nervous" or "uncertain" absent a direct
statement in the record to that effect, however, is unclear.
269. See State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 23-24 (Fla.) (must be support in the record for the
reasons given to ensure "procedural regularity and racial neutrality"), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219
(1988); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 386 Pa. Super. 29, 55, 562 A.2d 338, 350 (1989) (abuse of discre-
tion to accept explanation not supported by the record), appeal denied, 525 Pa. 631, 578 A.2d 926
(1990). Similarly, several courts have found subjective explanations alone to be insufficient to rebut a
prima facie case. See, ag., United States v. Horsley, 864 F.2d 1543, 1546 (1 lth Cir. 1989) ("I just
got a feeling about him" held insufficient); United States v. Clemons, 843 F.2d 741, 745 (3d Cir.)
(prosecutor's intuitive judgment held insufficient), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 835 (1988); Ward v. State,
293 Ark. 88, 93-94, 733 S.W.2d 728, 730 (1987) (insufficient to claim that challenged juror seemed
"noncommittal"); Exparte Branch, 526 So. 2d 609, 623 (Ala. 1987) ("[I]ntuitive judgment or suspi-
cion by the prosecutor is insufficient to rebut the presumption of discrimination."); State v.
Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 65 (Mo. 1987) (en banc) (facially neutral explanations alone held insuffi-
cient), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988); State v. Tomlin, 299 S.C. 294, 298-99, 384 S.E.2d 707, 710
(1989) (claim that challenged juror was "extremely sluggish" held insufficient).
270. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974). In addition, defendants might be unconstitu-
tionally deterred from exercising their right to appeal. Id.
271. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 375-76 (1982).
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plex and difficult to prove, the court in these circumstances may presume
"prosecutorial vindictiveness." 272 When this presumption arises, the prosecutor
must provide objective, on-the-record evidence supporting the decision to add
the new charges. 273 Although the decision to bring charges normally is discre-
tionary, the danger of unconstitutionally motivated prosecutorial conduct justi-
fies these limitations on the prosecutor's discretion.274 Similarly, when a prima
facie inference of discrimination arises in the Batson context, the court should
require the prosecutor to give at least some objective, verifiable reason for the
questioned peremptory challenges. Although prosecutors ordinarily may exer-
cise peremptory challenges for any reason, the danger that the prosecutor's ex-
planations will be pretextual warrants limiting prosecutors' discretion.
C. Procedural Issues
In addition to determining what evidence gives rise to a prima facie infer-
ence of discrimination and what prosecutorial explanations rebut such an infer-
ence, the Batson Court assigned to the lower courts the task of formulating
procedures for litigating Batson claims.27 5 The North Carolina courts' holdings
regarding procedural issues parallel their holdings involving the prima facie case
and the prosecutor's rebuttal. In the area of harmless error, for example, as with
the prima facie case, the North Carolina courts have misapprehended Batson's
theoretical underpinnings and, accordingly, have imposed undue burdens on de-
fendants. In the areas of appellate review and cross-examination of the prosecu-
tor, as with the prosecutor's rebuttal, the courts have construed Batson's
language so narrowly that they have failed to promote Batson's fundamental
purpose. In sum, the courts have erected procedural barriers that conflict with
Batson's goal of providing defendants with a more effective means of proving
discrimination.
1. Appellate Review
When formulating a standard of appellate review of trial court findings in
Batson cases, the courts face yet another contradiction inherent in Batson situa-
tions: the trust reposed in prosecutors and trial judges by appellate courts some-
times conflicts with the realities of racial politics. For example, while the Batson
Court observed in a footnote that judges and prosecutors would not fail to per-
form their constitutional duties under Batson,276 the decision itself is a recogni-
tion that government officials sometimes engage in unconstitutional
discrimination. As a result, the degree to which the appellate courts should
yield to the findings of the trial courts is questionable.
272. Id. at 373.
273. Id. at 374.
274. See id. at 376; Perry, 417 U.S. at 28.
275. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 ("We decline ... to formulate particular procedures to be fol-
lowed upon a defendant's timely objection to a prosecutor's challenges.").
276. Id. at 99 n.22.
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In State v. Jackson 277 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that because
a trial court's findings depend on credibility determinations, those findings must
be given "great deference" on appeal. 278 Trial judges must make specific find-
ings of fact,279 and those findings are conclusive on appeal, provided they are
supported by the evidence.280 In reviewing Batson cases, the supreme court and
court of appeals have been true to this standard. In numerous cases, the courts
explicitly have noted that deference to the trial court commanded their decision
to deny defendants Batson relief.281 The courts routinely have declined to strike
down even highly subjective rebuttal explanations on appeal, upholding all
facially nonracial explanations.282 The courts have been reluctant to give much
weight to objective indicators of discrimination, such as disparate treatment of
minority and white prospective jurors. Instead, they have relied on the general
proposition that prosecutors rarely exercise peremptory challenges for single
reasons and have deferred to the trial courts' overall evaluations of the circum-
stances. 283 This extremely deferential approach almost certainly has contrib-
uted to the fact that no North Carolina defendant has won a Batson claim on the
merits in the appellate courts.
While the appellate courts must accord the trial court's findings some defer-
ence, excessive deference has two related undesirable effects. First, it effectively
"insulates the trial court's determinations from meaningful appellate review."'284
Second, it sends to prosecutors the message that they may exercise peremptory
challenges on account of race without fear of exposure by the appellate
courts. 285 Because the second effect in particular is contrary to Batson's funda-
mental purpose, meaningful appellate review is essential to Batson's success.2 86
277. 322 N.C. 251, 368 S.E.2d 838 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110 (1989); see supra notes
235, 237-44 and accompanying text.
278. Jackson, 322 N.C. at 255, 368 S.E.2d at 840 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21); see State v.
Porter, 326 N.C. 489, 498, 391 S.E.2d 144, 150 (1990); State v. Allen, 323 N.C. 208, 219, 372 S.E.2d
855, 861-62 (1988). Other states have set forth similar standards of review. See Gamble v. State, 257
Ga. 325, 327, 357 S.E.2d 792, 794 (1987); People v. Harris, 129 Ill. 2d 123, 175, 544 N.E.2d 357, 380
(1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1323 (1990); State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 66 (Mo. 1987) (en
bane), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 176, 184, 380
S.E.2d 1, 5, aff'd on rehearing, 9 Va. App. 169, 384 S.E.2d 343 (1989) (en bane).
279. State v. Sanders, 95 N.C. App. 494, 500, 383 S.E.2d 409, 413, disc rev. denied, 325 N.C.
712, 388 S.E.2d 470 (1989).
280. Id.
281. State v. Gray, 322 N.C. 457, 459-60, 368 S.E.2d 627, 629 (1988); State v. McNeil, 99 N.C.
App. 235, 241, 393 S.E.2d 123, 126 (1990); State v. Robinson, 97 N.C. App. 597, 600, 601, 389
S.E.2d 417, 419, 420, dismissal allowed and review denied, 326 N.C. 804, 393 S.E.2d 904 (1990);
State v. Batts, 93 N.C. App. 404, 410, 378 S.E.2d 211, 214 (1989); State v. Cannon, 92 N.C. App.
246, 253, 374 S.E.2d 604, 608 (1988), rev'don other grounds, 326 N.C. 37, 387 S.E.2d 450 (1990). In
fact, the Jackson court noted: "We might not have reached the same result as the superior court but
giving, as we must, deference to its findings, we hold it was not error to deny the defendant's motion
for mistrial." Jackson, 322 N.C. at 257, 368 S.E.2d at 841.
282. See supra notes 235-56 and accompanying text.
283. See, eg., State v. Porter, 326 N.C. 489, 501, 391 S.E.2d 144, 152-53 (1990).
284. Blume, supra note 121, at 328.
285. Id. at 329. Conversely, if prosecutors know that the appellate courts will review their ac-
tions carefully, they are less likely to engage in discriminatory conduct in the first place.
286. Curiously, in Batson, Justice Powell seemed to suggest that there is little danger of prosecu-
tors exercising peremptory challenges for discriminatory reasons. In justifying his rejection of Jus-
tice Marshall's suggestion that the peremptory challenge be abolished, Justice Powell wrote that no
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Several reasons justify more aggressive appellate review of Batson claims.
First, because of their own unconscious racism, trial judges simply may not be
aware of racial discrimination during jury selection. 28 7 In addition, although
the Batson Court expressed confidence in the ability of trial judges to recognize
Batson claims, 288 the ultimate responsibility within each state for vindicating
rights under the equal protection clause lies with the state supreme court. Fur-
thermore, as with prosecutors' rebuttal explanations,2 89 the ease with which
prosecutors can put forth pretextual but facially neutral explanations necessi-
tates appellate intervention. Most important, appellate courts have a greater
duty to scrutinize trial court findings when constitutional rights are at stake.290
As the Maryland Court of Appeals held in the Batson context: "When a claim is
based upon a violation of a constitutional right it is [the appellate court's] obliga-
tion to make an independent constitutional appraisal from the entire record." 291
Therefore, the North Carolina appellate courts should scrutinize Batson claims
much more closely than in the past. To scrutinize these claims without merely
substituting their judgments on credibility issues for those of the trial judges, the
supreme court and court of appeals should place greater emphasis on objective
reason supports the belief that prosecutors will shirk their duty to exercise peremptory challenges
legitimately. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.22. If that were the case, there might be little need for deter-
rence. The fact that Batson was necessary, however, together with the large number of Batson chal-
lenges brought, is evidence that some prosecutors do exercise peremptories on account of race.
Indeed, Justice White commented that the practice is widespread. Id. at 101 (White, J., concurring).
Thus, aggressive appellate review to deter prosecutors' unconstitutional uses of peremptory chal-
lenges is appropriate.
287. Id. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("A judge's own conscious or unconscious racism may
lead him to accept ... an explanation as well supported."); Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the
Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 1016, 1026-36 (1988). Professor Johnson asserts that many
judicial actions and inactions are colored by judges' own unconscious racism. She contends that this
undetected racism results in a "blindspot" that causes judges to fail to recognize their own or other
persons' actions as racially connected. She cites three reasons for the fact that unconscious racism is
at present ignored in the reasoning of court decisions involving race and criminal procedure: (1) the
mistaken belief that racism is equivalent to white supremacism, (2) the fear that there would be no
limiting principle, and (3) denial. Id. at 1027-31. See generally Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 328-44 (1987) (dis-
cussing relationship between the unconscious and racially discriminatory practices).
288. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.22; id. at 101 (White, J., concurring) (Court puts "considerable
trust" in the trial judge).
289. See supra notes 252-68 and accompanying text.
290. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 513-14 (1984) (although questions
of fact are normally entitled to deferential appellate review, "actual malice" in constitutional defa-
mation case is subject to independent appellate review because its determination affects first amend-
ment rights).
291. Tolbert v. State, 315 Md. 13, 24, 553 A.2d 228, 232 (1989) (quoting Harris v. State, 303
Md. 685, 697, 496 A.2d 1074, 1080 (1985)); see Commonwealth v. Jackson, 386 Pa. Super. 29, 55,
562 A.2d 338, 350 (1989) (trial court's discretion is not unlimited), appeal denied, 525 Pa. 631, 578
A.2d 926 (1990).
In addition, the role of the state appellate courts in protecting defendants' rights under Batson
may be amplified in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412
(1985). In Wainwright the Court addressed the question whether federal courts, on petitions for
habeas corpus relief, may review state court findings on whether a juror was challenged properly for
cause under Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), on account of bias stemming from the
juror's opposition to the death penalty. The Court held that the propriety of the challenge for cause
is a "factual issue" entitled to a presumption of correctness, because'the determination depends
largely on credibility findings. Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 428. Since credibility determinations also
are central to Batson inquiries, the scope of federal habeas corpus review may be limited in this
context as well. Consequently, the states must aggressively promote Batson's goals.
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criteria. If objective evidence 292 suggests discrimination, or if the prosecutor's
reasons for challenging the jurors are completely subjective, the courts should
find a Batson error on appeal. Just as with the prosecutor's rebuttal, this focus
on observable, on-the-record criteria does not mean that less easily observable
criteria are irrelevant to the question of whether the prosecutor has exercised
peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner. Rather, it is an attempt to
promote the goals of Batson more effectively by providing a reasonable, practical
way of reviewing Batson cases.
A threshold requirement for meaningful appellate review is an adequate
record.293 This record must include the number of black and white persons on
the venire, the race of each prospective juror examined, and a transcript of the
voir dire.294 In North Carolina, defendants appealing from the denial of a Bat-
son claim have the burden of providing an adequate record from which to deter-
mine whether the prosecutor challenged jurors improperly at trial.29-
In the five years since Batson, North Carolina defendants consistently have
failed to meet their burden of providing an adequate record for appeal. On
many occasions, the appellate courts pointedly noted these failures in denying
defendants' Batson claims.2 96 These flaws can be eliminated easily, however,
because North Carolina law currently enables defendants to perfect adequate
appellate records. The jury selection statute permits transcription of the jury
selection proceedings upon the defendant's request.297 Thus, at the beginning of
all cases in which Batson may be an issue, defendants can invoke their statutory
right to have the voir dire transcribed. Slightly more problematic is the issue of
preserving for the record the race of each prospective juror. The supreme court
wisely noted in State v. Mitchell 298 that the practice of simply having the court
reporter record the race of each potential juror is prone to error because race is
292. Objective criteria include, for example, a disproportionate number of peremptory chal-
lenges exercised against minorities or disparate treatment of minority and white prospective jurors
with similar pertinent characteristics.
293. See, eg., State v. Holloway, 209 Conn. 636, 644, 553 A.2d 166, 172, cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1071 (1989); Aldridge v. State, 258 Ga. 75, 77, 365 S.E.2d 111, 113 (1988); Jackson, 386 Pa. Super,
at 52, 562 A.2d at 349; Note, supra note 142, at 825 ("All of the possible evidence that may bear on
the defendant's prima facie showing depends on the creation of an adequate record [for appeal].").
294. See Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 70 n.11, 542 A.2d 1267, 1277 n.11 (1988). Although a
record consisting solely of the race of the persons struck and of the persons who served on the jury
could "marginally suffice[]" for review, a transcript is necessary as a practical matter to facilitate
appellate courts' meaningful evaluations of the trial court's findings. State v. Sanders, 95 N.C. App.
494, 499, 383 S.E.2d 409, 412, disc, rev. denied, 325 N.C. 712, 388 S.E.2d 470 (1989).
295. See State v. Mitchell, 321 N.C. 650, 654, 365 S.E.2d 554, 556 (1988). The mere statements
of counsel on appeal regarding what transpired at trial will not suffice. Id.
296. See State v. Payne, 327 N.C. 194, 199-200, 394 S.E.2d 158, 160-61 (1990), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 977 (1991); State v. McNeill, 326 N.C. 712, 718-19, 392 S.E.2d 78, 82 (1990); State v. Aytche,
98 N.C. App. 358, 364, 391 S.E.2d 43, 47 (1990); State v. Robinson, 97 N.C. App. 597, 601, 389
S.E.2d 417, 420, disc rev. denied, 326 N.C. 804, 393 S.E.2d 904 (1990); Sanders, 95 N.C. App. at
499, 383 S.E.2d at 412; State v. Cannon, 92 N.C. App. 246, 251, 374 S.E.2d 604, 607 (1988), rev'd on
other grounds, 326 N.C. 37, 387 S.E.2d 450 (1990).
297. In capital cases, a record of the voir dire is required by statute. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
1241(a)(1) (1988). In noncapital cases, the jury selection must be recorded if defense counsel so
requests. Id. § 15A-1241(b); R. PRicE, supra note 54, § 18-3.
298. 321 N.C. 650, 365 S.E.2d 554 (1988).
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not always obvious.299 In response to the problem of how to preserve the rec-
ord, however, Mitchell provides that a defendant who believes a prospective ju-
ror is of a particular race may so inform the trial court and ensure that the
information is placed on the record. 30° For defendants to have to question pro-
spective jurors about their race during voir dire to determine officially the race of
prospective jurors, however, is unfair. Such questions might insult the juror and
convey to the jury the impression that the defendant intends to make race an
issue in the trial. Hence, the defendant would have a Hobson's choice: preserv-
ing the record and risking alienating the jury, or not preserving the record at all.
Upon the defendant's pretrial request, therefore, the trial judge should inquire
about each prospective juror's race. Under this practice, the race of the poten-
tial juror becomes a routine piece of requested information no different from the
juror's address; as such, it is less likely to insult the juror. Moreover, because
the judge asks the questions, defense counsel will not antagonize the jury. The
North Carolina Supreme Court has hinted that such a method would be permis-
sible,30 1 but the court should go further and formally adopt it.
2. Examination of the Prosecutor
Another procedural issue that has arisen in North Carolina Batson claims is
whether defendants may cross-examine prosecutors regarding their rebuttal ex-
planations.30 2 In State v. Jackson the supreme court held that defendants have
no such right.30 3 The court feared that the disruption to the trial would out-
weigh any good that could be achieved by the prosecutor's testimony. 3°4 More-
over, the court was confident that trial judges would be able to pass on
prosecutors' credibility without the aid of cross-examination. 30 5 The Jackson
court did hold, however, that once prosecutors advance their reasons for the
peremptory challenges in question, defendants may offer additional evidence to
strengthen the inference of purposeful discrimination or to expose the prosecu-
299. Id. at 655-56, 365 S.E.2d at 557. Moreover, the court reporter's guess for the race of the
potential juror is essentially a racial judgment based solely on appearance, and thus is susceptible to
the same stereotypes that underlie race-based peremptory challenges.
300. Id. at 656, 365 S.E.2d at 557. If there is any question about the juror's race, the trial court
may question the juror to determine it. Id.; see also State v. Payne, 327 N.C. 194, 199-200, 394
S.E.2d 158, 160-61 (1990) (suggesting that prior to trial defendant ask that the trial judge ask pro-
spective jurors to state their race for the record during initial questioning).
301. In Payne, the court wrote: "The trial court noted ... that had the defendant made his
motion prior to jury selection, the court would have had each prospective juror state his or her race
during the court's initial questioning. This would have... preserved an adequate record for appel-
late review." 327 N.C. at 199-200, 394 S.E.2d at 160; see also State v. Attmore, 92 N.C. App. 385,
397, 374 S.E.2d 649, 657 (1988) (trial judge noted race and sex of each person examined during voir
dire), disc rev. denied, 324 N.C. 248, 377 S.E.2d 757 (1989).
302. See Note, Defense Presence and Participation: A Procedural Minimum for Batson v. Ken-
tucky Hearings, 99 YALE L.J. 187, 205-06 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Defense Presence and Participa-
tion]; see also Note, supra note 142, at 832-36 (discussing advantages and disadvantages of
adversarial Batson hearings).
303. State v. Jackson, 322 N.C. 251, 258, 368 S.E.2d 838, 840 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110
(1989).
304. Id.; see also Note, Defense Presence and Participation, supra note 302, at 205 (administrative
burden would result from adversarial Batson hearings).
305. Jackson, 322 N.C. at 258, 368 S.E.2d at 842.
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tors' proffered reasons as mere pretexts for discrimination 0 6
In light of the purposes of Batson, the court underestimated the importance
of examining the prosecutor and thus unduly restricted the defendant's ability to
expose unconstitutional discrimination. 30 7 The trial judge's evaluation of credi-
bility is the most important trial-level determination in any Batson inquiry.30 8
Prosecutors easily can assert nonracial reasons for striking any juror; thus, the
primary issue for the court is whether those reasons are genuine or pretextual.30 9
Evaluating the credibility of prosecutors in Batson cases, however, is not a sim-
ple matter. Because of unconscious racism, trial judges may not recognize racial
discrimination. 3 10 Furthermore, many of the reasons that prosecutors advance
are subjective and vague.311 Some of these reasons involve subtle actions by the
prospective juror; others involve no objective indicia at all.312 Trial judges are
unlikely to observe these claimed grounds for the alleged discriminatory per-
emptory challenges unless they search for them. Therefore, the trial judge must
have an adequate opportunity to evaluate the prosecutor's sincerity when the
prosecutor explains her peremptory challenges.
For more than two centuries the belief that "no safeguard for testing the
value of human statements is comparable to that furnished by cross-examina-
tion" has pervaded Anglo-American law. 313 In light of the centrality of the
credibility issue to the Batson inquiry and the inherent difficulty of evaluating
the prosecutor's credibility, the North Carolina Supreme Court should permit
defendants to examine the prosecutors once the prosecutors have explained their
306. See id. (finding "no reason why the defendant could not have offered evidence to strengthen
his case after the State had made its showing"); see also State v. Porter, 326 N.C. 489, 497, 391
S.E.2d 144, 150 (1990) (expressly holding that after State advances its reasons for the disputed chal-
lenges defendant has right of surrebuttal to show that those reasons are pretextual); State v. Green,
324 N.C. 238, 240-41, 376 S.E.2d 727, 728 (1989) (same).
307. The Illinois Supreme Court has stated that because the prosecutor, an officer of the court, is
under a high professional obligation to speak truthfully, no need for cross-examination arises. Peo-
ple v. Young, 128 III. 2d 1, 24-25, 538 N.E.2d 453, 459 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S, Ct. 3290 (1990).
This argument is unpersuasive. Prosecutors are also under a high obligation to obey the fourteenth
amendment, to follow the dictates of the United States Supreme Court, and not to exercise peremp-
tory challenges on account of race. The need for Batson shows that some prosecutors, like other
lawyers; breach their professional obligations. Furthermore, some prosecutors simply are unaware
of the racial underpinnings of their actions. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring)
(unconscious racism may color prosecutor's judgments); Johnson, supra note 287, at 1026-36 (same).
Persons who might be denied their constitutional rights as a result of prosecutors' conscious or
unconscious racism are entitled to adequate procedures to protect those rights. Thus, prosecutors'
obligation to speak truthfully is no substitute for adequate procedures to evaluate their credibility.
308. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21 (trial judge's findings will depend largely on evaluation of
prosecutor's credibility); Jackson, 322 N.C. at 255, 368 S.E.2d at 840 (reviewing court should give
trial court's findings great deference because it depends on credibility).
309. See supra notes 252-56 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 287.
311. See supra text accompanying notes 253-54.
312. Id.
313. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 182, § 1367, at 32 (Chadbourne rev. 1974); see E. CLEARY, supra
note 119, § 19, at 47. So essential is cross-examination to the accuracy and completeness of testi-
mony, that it is a right and not merely a privilege in trials. E. CLEARY, supra note 119, § 19, at 47.
Wigmore described cross-examination as "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
truth" and "the great and permanent contribution of the Anglo-American system of law to im-




peremptory challenges. 3 14 The Jackson court's concern about and emphasis on
the disruption that might result from adversarial Batson hearings, while under-
standable at first glance, are unwarranted. Permitting examination of the prose-
cutor would not add substantially to the disruption of the trial, since Batson
hearings already involve an interruption of the trial. By the time the defendant
examines the prosecutor, the trial already would have been stopped for the de-
fendant to argue the existence of a prima facie case and for the prosecutor to
explain the disputed peremptory strikes. Furthermore, the defendant already
has the right to introduce further evidence in surrebuttal; examination of the
prosecutor would not take significantly more time. Trial judges can prevent un-
due disruption by exercising their traditional powers to preclude examination
that is badgering, repetitive, or a mere fishing expedition. Moreover, according
to Professor Raphael, most courts simply have not experienced undue disrup-
tions as a result of adversarial Batson hearings. 315 Most important, a small,
additional disruption in the trial cannot justify withholding from defendants the
legal system's most effective tool for exposing the falsity of prosecutors' asser-
tions when the constitutional rights of minority defendants and prospective ju-
rors are at stake.
At the very least, no rationale justifies the North Carolina Supreme Court's
absolute prohibition of examining the prosecutor. When a prosecutor must ex-
plain his peremptory challenges in a hearing on remand from an appellate court,
disruption of the trial is not a concern. In this situation no reason exists for an
absolute prohibition against cross-examining the prosecutor because the problem
at the heart of the Jackson court's rationale for the prohibition is absent.3 16
Moreover, the trial judge is in the best position to determine the value of exam-
ining the prosecutor and the disruption that might result from that examination.
The trial judge, therefore, should at least have the discretion to permit examina-
tion of the prosecutor.
3. Harmless Error
The North Carolina Supreme Court also has addressed the procedural issue
of harmless error under Batson. In State v. Robbins 3 17 the court rejected the
defendant's Batson claim in part because the defendant failed to exhaust his al-
lotted peremptory challenges, the theory apparently being that the defendant
still could have removed jurors with whom he was dissatisfied and thus was not
prejudiced by any Batson errors. 318 This holding once again misconstrues the
314. One commentator has suggested that defendants ordinarily should be permitted to examine
the prosecutor, with exceptions made only if the prosecutor demonstrates that his trial strategy
would be "compromised substantially" as a result of the examination. See Raphael, supra note 178,
at 338.
315. Professor Raphael reported: "The experience of most courts ... indicates that the Jackson
court was in error in fearing that cross-examination of a prosecutor would be disruptive ....
Raphael, supra note 178, at 338.
316. See Note, supra note 142, at 205.
317. See supra notes 160-76 and accompanying text.
318. State v. Robbins, 319 N.C. 465, 495, 356 S.E.2d 279, 297 (citing State v. Wilson, 313 N.C.
516, 524, 330 S.E.2d 450, 457 (1985)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987); see also State v. Davis, 325
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constitutional principles upon which Batson is based.
The North Carolina Supreme Court's requirement that parties exercise all
of their peremptory challenges to show prejudice derives from cases in which
defendants claimed the trial court improperly denied their challenges for cause.
The court held in those cases that the defendants were not prejudiced by the trial
judge's refusal to excuse the jurors because, if they truly wanted the jurors off
the jury, the defendants could have removed them with their remaining peremp-
tory challenges.3 19 These cases are inapposite, however, to attacks by defend-
ants on prosecutorial peremptory challenges under Batson. When defendants
make Batson claims, they are not necessarily asserting particular dissatisfaction
with the persons who actually served on the jury. Rather, the claim simply is
that some persons were removed unconstitutionally from the jury. This claim is
especially true because, even if the defendants are not harmed by prosecutors'
discriminatory peremptory challenges, such challenges deny the excluded jurors
equal protection of the laws and undermine public confidence in the legal sys-
tem.320 "Prejudice" for the purposes of Batson, therefore, is present when any
person is peremptorily challenged on account of race. The fact that defendants
still had peremptory challenges remaining and could have used them to strike
persons accepted by the prosecutor does not remove this prejudice. Indeed, the
United States Supreme Court has noted that because jury selection goes to the
very integrity of the legal system, harmless error analysis simply does not ap-
ply.321 Thus, the North Carolina Supreme Court's reliance on its previous cases
dealing with prejudice and the use of peremptory challenges is misplaced.
D. Justifications for Suggested Doctrinal Revisions
North Carolina's implementation of Batson has been marked by a constric-
tive view of the decision and a misapprehension of Batson's operation and con-
stitutional underpinnings. The courts have misconstrued the operation of the
prima facie case by improperly considering challenged jurors' voir dire responses
when determining whether an inference of discrimination exists. The courts
N.C. 607, 620, 386 S.E.2d 418, 424 (1989) (finding no prejudice when defendant had three peremp-
tory challenges remaining), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 2587 (1990).
319. See, eg., State v. Quesinberry, 319 N.C. 228, 235, 354 S.E.2d 446, 450 (1987), vacated on
other grounds, 110 S. Ct. 1465 (1990); State v. Avery, 315 N.C. 1, 21, 337 S.E.2d 786, 797 (1985); see
also State v. Wilson, 313 N.C. 516, 524-25, 330 S.E.2d 450, 457 (1985) (defendant dissatisfied with
jurors recruited by sheriff during middle of jury selection). These cases applied the North Carolina
jury selection procedures statute, which provides in part: "In order for a defendant to seek reversal
of the case on appeal on the ground that the judge refused to allow a challenge made for cause, he
must have:
(1) Exhausted the peremptory challenges available to him[.]" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1214(h)
(1) (1988).
320. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87.
321. See Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668 (1987) (Witherspoon error resulting in improper
exclusion of jurors for cause in death penalty case is never harmless); see also Mitchell v. State, 295
Ark. 341, 351, 750 S.W.2d 936, 941 (1988) (Despite evidence of overwhelming guilt, Batson error
requires reversal, since "[w]e are concerned here with prejudice to the system of justice."); ef. State
v. Cofield, 320 N.C. 297, 301, 303, 357 S.E.2d 622, 624-25, 626 (1987) (question is not whether racial
discrimination in selection of grand jury foreperson affected the outcome of the proceedings, but
rather whether there was racial discrimination at all).
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readily have accepted any facially neutral reason put forth by prosecutors as
sufficient to rebut a prima facie case, and have paid excessive deference to trial
court findings of Batson issues.
The courts' narrow views of Batson may be explained by North Carolina's
historical support for the peremptory challenge. North Carolina was one of the
first states to permit the exercise of peremptory challenges and, more particu-
larly, prosecutorial peremptory challenges.3 22 As a result, the North Carolina
courts have sought to give life to Batson without meaningfully changing the ex-
ercise of the peremptory challenge. This phenomenon has been most evident in
the wide range of rebuttal reasons the courts have accepted; they have been un-
willing to reject any facially nonracial explanation that, by definition, is ordina-
rily a proper basis for a peremptory challenge. The result, however, has been a
scheme that has been ineffective in answering Batson's challenge to erradicate
jury selection discrimination. The inherent conflict between the equal protection
clause and the peremptory challenge means that equal protection cannot be
guaranteed without intrusions on the peremptory challenge. Unless the North
Carolina courts revise their approach to Batson and promote in practical ways
the decision's fundamental goal of eliminating discrimination, Batson protection
in North Carolina may become permanently illusory.
The revisions suggested in this Comment are justified for several reasons,
despite their limitations on North Carolina prosecutors' traditional uses of per-
emptory challenges. Most important, the North Carolina Constitution provides
special protections against discrimination in jury selection; indeed, they are
stronger than those contained in the federal constitution. Article 1, section 26 of
the North Carolina Constitution expressly provides that "[n]o person shall be
excluded from jury service on account of sex, race, color, religion, or national
origin.' ' 32 3 This provision is distinct from, and in addition to, the state equal
protection clause.3 24 In State v. Cofield 3 2 5 the supreme court construed section
26 in the context of grand jury foreperson selection. In powerful language, the
court noted that by adopting this constitutional provision the people of North
Carolina
have declared that they will not tolerate the corruption of their juries
by racism, sexism and similar forms of irrational prejudice. They have
recognized that the judicial system of a democratic society must oper-
ate evenhandedly if it is to command the respect and support of those
subject to its jurisdiction.3 26
322. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text. In addition, the North Carolina trial tradi-
tion has been to promote freedom for its attorneys in selecting juries. See supra note 54.
323. N.C. CONsr. art. I, § 26.
324. See id. § 19. This section provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws; nor shall any person be subjected to discrimination by the State because of
race, color, religion, or national origin." Id.
325. 320 N.C. 297, 357 S.E.2d 622 (1987) (Cofield I).
326. Id. at 302, 357 S.E.2d at 625. The supreme court found the need for racially neutral proce-
dures so imperative that in Cofield H the court again reversed the defendant's conviction because of
the grand jury foreperson selection process employed, even though the court was "satisfied that there
was not the slightest hint of racial motivation" in the judge's selection of the foreperson. State v.
Cofield, 324 N.C. 452, 459-60, 379 S.E.2d 834, 839 (1989) (Cofield II).
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The court explicitly acknowledged that this policy applies not only to the selec-
tion of grand jury forepersons, but also to the selection of petit jurors. 327 As
Justice Mitchell explained in his concurring opinion: "[1]t is clear beyond any
doubt that this section of our Constitution was intended as an absolute guaran-
tee that all citizens of this State would participate fully in the honor and obliga-
tion of jury service in all forms; as petit jurors, grand jurors, and as foremen of
the grand jury. ' 328 The supreme court later discussed the specific relationship
of peremptory challenges to section 26 in Jackson v. Housing Authority.3 29 The
Housing Authority court observed: "Although long embedded in our common
law, the use of peremptory challenges is based upon statutory authority and is
not of [state] constitutional dimension. Therefore, the statutory authority to ex-
ercise peremptory challenges must yield to ... constitutional mandate . "... ,,30
The mandate of the people of North Carolina thus requires that the North Caro-
lina appellate courts rigorously protect defendants and prospective jurors from
invidious discrimination, even if it means contraction of a prosecutor's use of
peremptory challenges.
This Comment's recommended revisions also are justified because the per-
emptory challenge simply is not of federal constitutional magnitude, 331 and rea-
sonable limitations on its use are essential to the protection of fourteenth
amendment rights. Furthermore, proponents of the prosecutorial peremptory
challenge overstate its historical significance. Professor Van Dyke has noted
that peremptory challenges "have been subject to abuse from the time juries
were first introduced in England. ' 332 This phenomenon was true despite per-
emptory challenges in England being much less sdsceptible to discriminatory use
than those in the United States because of the homogeneity of English society; in
the heyday of the English peremptory challenge, only propertied males could
serve as jurors.333 As times changed and English jurors became more diverse,
Parliament limited, and eventually abolished, the peremptory challenge. 334
Similarily, the historical significance of peremptory challenges in North Caro-
lina is less than overwhelming. Although the North Carolina General Assembly
in 1827 granted prosecutors the right to exercise peremptory challenges, it was
not until one hundred fifty years later that they gave prosecutors the same
327. Cofield I, 320 N.C. at 303, 357 S.E.2d at 626; see also State v. Mitchell, 321 N.C. 650, 653,
365 S.E.2d 554, 556 (1988) (recognizing that Batson and Cofield I stand for analogous propositions
that potential jurors may not be excluded nor grand jury forepersons selected on discriminatory
grounds).
328. Cofield I, 320 N.C. at 310, 357 S.E.2d at 630 (Mitchell, J., concurring).
329. 321 N.C. 584, 364 S.E.2d 416 (1988). Jackson prohibited the exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges on account of race in civil cases. Id. at 585, 364 S.E.2d at 417.
330. Id. As early as 1887, the North Carolina Supreme Court recognized that "if [the prosecu-
tor's right to stand jurors aside] had been (abused] ... such abuse would have warranted a recall of
the permission." State v. Sloan, 97 N.C. 499, 502-03, 2 S.E. 666, 668 (1887).
331. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 108 (Marshall, J., concurring); Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S.
583, 586 (1919). The Court has held that the right to peremptory challenge may be withheld with-
out impairing the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury. Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S.
497, 505 n.11 (1948); United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145 (1936).
332. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 147.
333. See Alschuler, supra note 7, at 165.
334. See Gobert, supra note 27, at 528-29.
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number of peremptory challenges as defendants.335
The final justification for this Comment's suggested revisions to North Car-
olina's Batson law is that the practical value of the peremptory challenge is ques-
tionable.336 In a 1978 study, for example, the prospective jurors whom the
prosecutor peremptorily challenged were as likely to favor convictions as were
the jurors actually selected. 337 It follows that the most important function of
the peremptory challenge is not to facilitate the selection of juries that are actu-
ally impartial, but rather to foster the perception of impartiality and thus pro-
mote confidence in the criminal justice system.338 Both Batson and Cofield
teach that when peremptory challenges are used for discriminatory reasons,
"[t]he harm... extends... to touch the entire community" because unconstitu-
tionally motivated challenges "undermine public confidence in the fairness of
our system of justice."'339 Limiting the use of the peremptory challenge to pro-
tect against discrimination, therefore, is not only justified, but is the only way
that the peremptory challenge may perform its function of promoting confidence
in the criminal justice system.
V. CONCLUSION
Five years after Batson, no North Carolina defendant has attacked
prosecutorial peremptory challenges successfully on equal protection grounds.
Batson has been rendered ineffective in North Carolina by the North Carolina
appellate courts' efforts to minimize Batson's impact on the peremptory chal-
lenge, a device historically employed in North Carolina. The American criminal
justice system is not big enough for both the equal protection clause and the
traditional, arbitrary and capricious peremptory challenge; the equal protection
clause and the peremptory challenge are inherently contradictory. Conse-
quently, the North Carolina courts must revise their approach to Batson and
promote more effectively Batson's primary goal of eradicating the discriminatory
use of peremptory challenges. As Justice Frye of the North Carolina Supreme
Court recognized: "[lit is the province of the courts [of North Carolina] to
ensure that [peremptory challenges] are used in such a manner not offensive to
the constitutional rights of our citizens. ' '340
PAUL H. SCHWARTZ
335. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
336. See R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY 129 (1983) ("no hard
evidence that current systematic jury selection methods are useful in typical felony cases"); Note,
The Case for Striking Peremptory Strikes, supra note 140, at 212-13.
337. Zeisel & Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An Experi-
ment in a Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REv. 491, 513-18 (1978).
338. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
339. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87.
340. State v. Jackson, 322 N.C. 251, 260, 368 S.E.2d 838, 843 (1988) (Frye, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1110 (1989).
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